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Abstract
Part I of this Note will briefly outline Community policy on product liability as detailed by
the Product Liability Directive, then review the development of product liability law in various
Member States of the European Community. Part II will analyze how the concept of state-of-the-
art highlighted tensions between a strict liability regime and a negligence regime in U.S. product
liability. It will then review similar discord in the European Community caused by the develop-
ment risk defense. Finally, Part III of this Note will argue that in contrast to the United States,
the European Community has thus far chosen to stay true to the strict product liability label in its
implementation of the development risk defense.
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INTRODUCTION
Reginald Payne, sixty-three, was found dead at the foot of
cliffs days after his wife, Sally was found suffocated in their home
in Cornwall.' Payne was prescribed Prozac to treat the depres-
sion that had developed after his retirement.2 On the eleventh
day of his Prozac treatment, Payne suffocated his wife then threw
himself off a cliff near their home.' The three surviving sons of
Reginald and Sally Payne have filed a product liability lawsuit
before the British High Court against Eli Lilly, the manufacturer
of Prozac.4 Hundreds of similar cases have been brought against
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law; Fordham International
Law Journal Managing Editor, Vol. XXVIII; Ph.D., 2000, University of Pennsylvania;
A.B., 1994, Cornell University. The author would like to thank Professors George Conk
and Benjamin Zipursky for their guidance in this endeavor. Special thanks goes to Neil
Dennis, Michel Paradis, and Michele Totah for their comments that helped this piece
take shape. This Note is dedicated to my grandfather, Ping-yu, who is unable to be with
me today but nevertheless shares in this accomplishment.
1. See Body Found, SUNDAY TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at Home News (reporting finding
of Payne's body). See also Robert Verkaik, The Paynes Expected a Peaceful Retirement. It
Ended in Violent Death. But Was Prozac to Blame?, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Dec. 4, 2000,
at 3 (detailing events leading to Reginald Payne's murder of his wife and his subsequent
suicide).
2. See Verkaik, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining Payne had developed depression after
retiring from his job as teacher); Angela M. Walker, R[x]: Take Two of These and Sue Me
in the Morning; the Emergence of Litigation Regarding Psychotropic Medication in the United
States and Europe, 19 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 775, 789 (2002) (stating Payne had been
on Prozac treatment).
3. See Verkaik, supra note 1, at 3 (noting Payne's homicidal and suicidal behavior
manifested eleven days after he started taking Prozac); Walker, supra note 2, at 790
(pointing out that Payne killed himself and his wife eleven days after he started taking
Prozac).
4. See Verkaik, supra note 1, at 3 (remarking that Paynes' sons plan to go to British
High Court in 2001 to prove that Prozac was to blame for their parents' death); Walker,
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Eli Lilly and other antidepressant manufacturers.5
In the United States, a majority of courts hold that most
therapeutic drugs, like Prozac, are unavoidably unsafe products
that fall under the ambit of comment k,6 exempting them from
strict product liability.' The concern underlying the comment k
exception is the impact of imposing strict liability on the phar-
maceutical sector and the deterring effect on innovation of new
drugs.8 Under comment k, manufacturers of drug products are
held to a negligence standard rather than to strict liability.9
supra note 2, at 790 (asserting that as of February 14, 2002, Payne's case is first Prozac
product liability lawsuit in Great Britain).
5. See Walker, supra note 2, at 775 (observing hundreds of cases involving Prozac
have been brought in United States and abroad); Andrew E. Falsetti, Fluoxetine-Induced
Suicidal Ideation: An Examination of the Medical Literature, Case Law, and the Legal Liability
of Drug Manufacturers, 57 FOOD DRUG L.J. 273, 283 (reporting that hundreds of suits
have been brought against Eli Lilly and other antidepressant manufacturers). Fluoxe-
tine is the generic chemical name of Prozac. See Falsetti, supra at 274 (mentioning
fluoxetine as chemical name of Prozac). See also, Prozac Prescribing Information, Eli
Lilly & Co., at 1 available at http://pi.lilly.com/prozac.pdf (2003) (copy on file with
author) (noting fluoxetine is generic chemical name of Prozac). A comprehensive re-
view of medical literature studying the link between fluoxetine and suicidal ideation is
provided by Falsetti, who has a Pharm.D. degree. See Falsetti, supra (reviewing medical
literature discussing relationship between fluoxetine and suicidal ideation). Falsetti
concludes that medical literature does not support an association between fluoxetine
and suicidal ideation. See Falsetti, supra at 280-83 (noting clinical trial data does not
support link between fluoxetine and suicidal ideation).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)],
cmt. k (pointing out that products, like drugs, are unavoidably unsafe). See also,
Walker, supra note 2, at 780 (declaring that Prozac is unavoidably unsafe product);
Falsetti, supra note 5, at 284 (reviewing cases against antidepressant manufacturers and
noting courts have followed comment k which imposes negligence standard for unavoid-
ably safe products like Prozac).
7. See Walker, supra note 2, at 780 (citing comment k of Section 402A of Restatement
(Second) for proposition that manufacturers are not liable for unavoidably unsafe prod-
ucts); JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TwERSm, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, PROBLEMS AND
PROCESS 456 (4th ed. 2000) (1938) (explaining comment k has been adopted in over-
whelming majority ofjurisdictions and imposes liability on drug manufacturers only if it
fails to warn of defect).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), cmt. k (pointing to pharmaceutical sector as spe-
cific example of industry directly impacted by comment k). See also, HENDERSON & TWER-
sI, supra note 7, at 455-56 (commenting on discussions of America Law Institute in
deciding whether to impose strict liability on pharmaceutical sector).
9. See Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories), 751 P.2d 470, 475 (Cal.
1988) (asserting comment k is based on principles of negligence). See also Victor E.
Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Comment
K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1139, 1141 (1985) (explaining Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)") authors believed that negligence law was ade-
quate for design of drugs).
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In the European Community ("EC"),1" product liability law
is governed by the Product Liability Directive 85/374 ("Direc-
tive")," which imposes strict liability on manufacturers of defec-
tive products but allows an exception to liability for development
risks.1 2 In the case of prescription drugs like Prozac, the manu-
facturer may escape liability under the development risk defense
if the manufacturer can show that the defect was undiscoverable
given the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time
the product was put into circulation. 13 The implementation of
the development risk defense in the EC has been quite conten-
tious." The defense has been accused of blurring the line be-
tween strict liability and negligence.
What is the difference between strict product liability and
negligence in a design defect case? This classic doctrinal ques-
tion has had product liability scholars pontificating and theo-
rizing for decades.' 5 The move in the United States towards the
10. See generally JAMES HANLON, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 3-4 (3d ed. 2003)
(1998) (providing general information on European Community ("EC") and EC law);
CHRIS VINCENZI &JOHN FAIRHURST, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 4-7 (3d ed. 2002)
(discussing EC and laws pertaining to EC). The Treaty of Paris in 1951 and the Treaties
of Rome in 1957 marked the beginning of efforts towards the integration of Europe,
setting up the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"), the European Economic
Community ("EEC"), and the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"). See
HANLON, supra at 3-4 (mentioning treaties setting up three Communities); VINCENZI &
FAIRHURST, supra at 4-7 (describing treaties unifying Western European). In 1965, the
Merger Treaty further consolidated the institutions of the three Communities into one
European Council, one European Commission, one European Court of Justice, and
one European Parliament. See HANLON, supra at 5 (discussing Merger Treaty); VINCENZI
& FAIRHURST, supra at 7 (noting simplification of Communities' institutional structure).
The Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992 further unified Europe by creating the
European Union. See HANLON, supra at 9 (detailing creation of European Union);
VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra at 12-13 (explaining Treaty on European Union). For the
sake of consistency, this Note will refer to the entity as the European Community.
11. Council Directive No. 85/374, O.J. L 210/29 (1985) [hereinafter Directive].
12. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 7(e). See also HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra
note 7, at 706-07 (describing European Product Liability Directive).
13. See Walker, supra note 2, at 783 (noting development risk defense is applica-
tion to product liability actions involving Prozac); Jane Stapleton, Products Liability in the
United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 45, 50 (1999) [hereinafter Sta-
pleton, Myths of Reform] (commenting on importance of development risk defense to
pharmaceutical industry).
14. See HENDERSON & TwER~i, supra note 7, at 707 (declaring implementation of
development risk provision to be most controversial issue in EC); Lori M. Linger, The
Products Liability Directive: A Mandatory Development Risks Defense, 14 FORDHAM INr'L L.J.
478, 490 (1991) (remarking on controversy caused by implementation of development
risk defense).
15. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV.
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Restatement (Third): Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)") may
cause some to wonder if such distinction matters. 16 For product
liability in the EC, the distinction between the strict liability and
negligence regime is of critical importance.
17
Professor Anita Bernstein described the imposition of strict
liability on the European Member States as a well-designed labo-
ratory experiment for Americans to study the question of what
strict liability means.1 8 Bernstein asserted that under the Direc-
tive, three parallel laboratory experiments will be run giving ob-
servers the opportunity to consider: (1) the shift from de facto
strict liability to de jure strict product liability;"9 (2) the move
377, 380-82 (2002) (outlining negligence-strict liability debate); Richard L. Cupp, Jr. &
Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Anal-
ysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 874 (2002) (remarking on questionable distinction between neg-
ligence and strict liability in design defect cases); Anita Bernstein, Looking at Europe for
the Difference Between Strict and Fault-Based Liability, 14 J. PRODUCTS LIABILITY 207, 207
(1992) (commenting on scholarly discussion of difference between strict product liabil-
ity and negligence based liability); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of
the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 654-56 (1992) (describing shift
of tort law from negligence to strict liability and outlining gradual rejection of strict
product liability, especially in design defect cases); John Montgomery & David G. Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defect Products, 27 S.C.
L. REv. 803, 810 (1976) (pointing out imposition of seller liability despite exercise of all
possible care distinguishes strict liability from traditional negligence law). See generally
Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972) (discussing Judge Learned Hand's test for fault and application of strict
liability).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD): PRODUCTS LIABILITY [hereinafter RESTATMENT
(THIRD)]. See also Cupp & Polage, supra note 15, at 874 (noting Restatement (Third)
subjects product liability claims to negligence analysis); Henderson, supra note 15, at
404-05 (arguing negligence, not strict liability, is only viable concept for product liabil-
ity and is represented by Restatement (Third)).
17. SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and Other
Countries Can Learn From the New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 TEX. INT'L
LJ. 1 (1999) (criticizing Europe for sticking to strict liability while United States heads
back to negligence); CI-RISTOPHERJ.S. HODGES, PRODUCT LIABILITY EUROPEAN LAWS AND
PRACTICE 6-8 (1993) (discussing European move to strict liability and its benefits); GE-
RAINT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY 311-22 (1993) (distinguishing be-
tween strict product liability and negligence based liability and considerations support-
ing each). For general information on European product liability, see WILLIAM C.
HOFFMAN & SUSANNE HILL-ARNING, GUIDE TO PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE (1994); PAT-
RICK KELLY & REBECCA AT-rREE, EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY (1992).
18. See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 213 (asserting EC move to strict liability will
provide opportunity to study meaning of strict liability).
19. See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 212 (noting France and Luxembourg have de
facto strict liability); Hans C. Taschner, Product Liability in Europe: Future Prospects, in EEC
Strict Liability in 1992, at 84 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
371, 1989) (noting France and Luxembourg have de facto strict liability).
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from a shifted-presumption approach to strict liability;2° and (3)
the change from pre-Greenman and -Henningsen America to strict
liability.2' Additionally, countries that do impose liability for de-
velopment risk would constitute a laboratory by themselves in
determining whether imposition of liability for unknown risks
will give a different result from countries that allow the develop-
ment risk defense.22 The European experiment is now well on
its way and looks to be heading in the direction of strict liabil-
ity.2 3
Part I of this Note will briefly outline Community policy on
product liability as detailed by the Product Liability Directive,
then review the development of product liability law in various
Member States of the European Community. Part II will analyze
how the concept of state-of-the-art highlighted tensions between
a strict liability regime and a negligence regime in U.S. product
liability. It will then review similar discord in the European
Community caused by the development risk defense. Finally,
Part III of this Note will argue that in contrast to the United
States, the European Community has thus far chosen to stay true
to the strict product liability label in its implementation of the
development risk defense.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. Product Liability Policy in the European Community
The Product Liability Directive was adopted in July 1985,24
establishing a community policy on product liability in the EC
but leaving the specifics of implementation to the Member
20. See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 212 (noting Britain shifts burden of proof to
defendant once product defect is shown); Taschner, supra note 19, at 84 (stating Brit-
ain has reversed burden of proof).
21. See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 212 (stating less wealthy countries generally
follow fault and warranty rules literally); Taschner, supra note 19, at 84 (noting Spain,
before Consumer Protection Act of 1984, relied on traditional fault liability).
22. See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 213 (referring to Luxembourg); Linger, supra
note 14, at 498-99 (noting Luxembourg rejected development risk defense).
23. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 17, at 20 (criticizing Europe for sticking
to strict liability while United States heads back to negligence); Christopher J. S.
Hodges, Product Liability in Europe: Politics, Reform and Reality, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
121, 123-24 (2000) [hereinafter Hodges, Politics, Reform and Reality] (outlining recent
case law in Europe).
24. See Directive, supra note 11 (establishing product liability law for EC).
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States.25 The Directive did not preempt product liability law in
the Member States, 26 but instead, sought to supplement existing
law to the extent that it was consistent with the Directive. 27 Two
basic goals of the Directive are discernable from the Preamble of
the Directive:28  (1) to promote the free movement of goods by
25. See VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra note 10, at 37 (stating directives leave imple-
mentation to Member States); John G. Culhane, The Limits of Product Liability Reform
Within a Consumer Expectation Model: A Comparison of Approaches Taken by the United States
and the European Union, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 29 (1995) (explaining
that directives establish community policy but leave implementation to Member State).
26. See Directive supra note 11, at pmbl. The Preamble states in part:
Whereas under the legal systems of the Member States an injured party may
have a claim for damages based on grounds of contractual liability or on
grounds of non-contractual liability other than that provided for in this Direc-
tive in so far as these provisions also serve to attain the objective of effective
protection of consumers, they should remain unaffected by this Directive
whereas, in so far as effective protection of consumers in the sector of pharma-
ceutical products is already also attained in a Member State under a special
liability system, claims based on this system should similarly remain possible.
Id. Member States are governed by Community law, the primary source of which comes
from the Treaty of Paris and Treaties of Rome, as amended by subsequent treaties. See
HANLON, supra note 10, at 102 (stating primary source of Community law consists of
three original treaties); VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra note 10, at 180 (discussing role of
Treaty of Paris and Treaties of Rome as primary source of law). Institutions set up
under these treaties are given the power to pass secondary legislation - mainly deci-
sions, directives, and regulation. See HANLON, supra note 10, at 102-03 (discussing role
of decisions, directives and regulations as secondary sources of Community law);
VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra note 10, at 36 (discussing secondary legislation, which
comprise of decisions, directives, and regulations). Regulations are a detailed form of
law which become valid in the Member States without further implementation. See
HANLON, supra note 10, at 104 (stating regulations are valid in Member States without
further implementation); VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra note 10, at 36 (stating regula-
tions are binding and have general application). In contrast to regulations, directives
are binding only as to the desired results and require implementation by Member
States. See HANLON, supra note 10, at 105 (discussing force of directives); VINCENZI &
FAIRHURST, supra note 10, at 37 (stating directives leave implementation to Member
States). Decisions are acts of law that are binding and enforceable in its entirety upon
those to whom it is addressed. See HANLON, supra note 10, at 106 (describing decisions
as binding and enforceable acts of law); VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra note 10, at 38
(stating decisions are binding in its entirety and is addressed to person or Member
State).
27. See Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, Desperately Seeking Harmony: The Euro-
pean Community's Search for Uniformity in Product Liability Law, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 35, 41
(1992) (remarking Directive supplements rather than preempts Member State product
liability law to extent that Member State law is consistent with the Directive); Andrew C.
Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 341, 351
(2000) (stating Directive supplements various Member States' liability schemes but does
not replace it).
28. See Directive supra note 11, at pmbl. The Preamble states in part:
Whereas approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the lia-
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harmonizing national approaches among Member States;29 and
(2) to protect consumers by establishing a strict product liability
system.30
1. Liability for Defective Products under the Directive
The Directive lays out strict product liability in twenty two
articles and defines specific terms to clarify the Directive's
scope. 31 Article 2 defines product as "all movables . . . even
though incorporated into another movable or into an immova-
ble. 13 2 Electricity is specifically included as a "product, '33  and
while the original scope of the Directive did not include primary
agricultural products, such items were defined as products after
bility of the producer for damage caused by the defectiveness of his products is
necessary because the existing divergences may distort competition and affect
the movement of goods within the common market and entail a differing de-
gree of protection of the consumer against damage caused by a defective
product to his health or property.
Whereas liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of
adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality,
of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological produc-
tion.
Id. See HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 29 (1993) (stating Directive has two discernable
goals and citing Preamble of Directive).
29. See Warren Freedman, European Community Law, Strasbourg Convention, EEC
Draft Directive, and Harmonization Efforts in Products Liability 8 (Report published on the
occasion of its 12th Biennial Conference on the Law of the World in Berlin, West Ger-
many, The World Peace Through Law Center, July 21-26, 1985) (stating EEC Draft
Directive on Product Liability sought to harmonize national laws on product liability
and promote free flow of products); MaryJ. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibil-
ity: A Vision for Comparative Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281, 332 (1994)
(asserting one main focus of -Directive was to prevent distorted competition among
Member States that had divergent national laws).
30. See Freedman, supra note 29, at 8 (stating EEC Draft Directive on Product Lia-
bility set up strict liability system to protect consumers); Davis, supra note 29, at 332
(stating consumer well-being and protection is second goal of Directive).
31. See Directive, supra note 11, arts. 1-22 (setting out strict product liability in
twenty-two articles and defining terms).
32. Id. art. 2 (defining product as all movables). In contrast to U.S. law, under the
Directive, human blood and blood products would fall under "products." See HODGES,
supra note 17, at 51 (stating human products such as book, tissue and organs are "prod-
ucts" under Directive); George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Product Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1089 (2000) (stating blood products are
excluded from the Restatement (Third) entirely). In the United States, the vast majority
of state legislatures have enacted shield statues that protect sellers of blood from strict
product liability. See HENDERSON & TwERS~i, supra note 7, at 105 (stating forty-nine
states have enacted blood shield statutes); Conk, supra at 1094 (asserting forty-seven
states have blood shield laws).
33. Directive, supra note 11, art. 2.
2004] TWO ROADS DIVERGED IN A YELLOW WOOD 1947
the "mad cow" crisis.3 4 Producer is defined broadly in Article 3 as
the producer of a finished product, any raw material or a compo-
nent part, and any person who presents himself as a producer by
putting his name or mark on the product.35 In addition, anyone
who imports a product that falls under Article 2 can also be held
liable. 6 Persons involved in the production chain, such as sup-
pliers and retailers are not liable as long as they can identify a
producer.3 7 According to Article 4, the injured person is re-
quired to prove: (1) the damage; (2) the defect; and (3) the
causal link between the defect and the damage. 8
This defect is tied to consumer expectation3 9 and is defined
34. See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REv.
1225, 1234-37 (2002) [hereinafter Stapleton, Bugs in Products Liability] (discussing im-
pact of mad cow crisis in England and amendment of Directive in response to poor
handling of crisis by Member States). The scope of the Directive was extended by
Council Directive No. 1999/34/EC, OJ. L 141/20, at 20-21 (1999). See Directive on Lia-
bility for Defective Products (Consumer Affairs, European Commission), available at http:/
/europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons safe/prod safe/defectprod/direc-
tiveen.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) (stating that Directive 1999/34/EC eliminated
possibility of derogation for primary agricultural products in aftermath of mad cow
crisis).
35. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 3 (defining producer). See generally HOWELLS,
supra note 17, at 30-32 (discussing scope of Article 3 in defining producer).
36. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 3, § 2 (making importers of defective products
liable). See also Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of Product Liability Law in Euro-
pean Community, 34 TEX. INT'L LJ. 21, 30 (1999) (stating Article 3(2) covers anyone
importing products into Community, although imports within EC are not covered);
Mark Mildred, Litigation Rules and Culture: The European Perspective, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L &
Soc. CHANGE 433, 436 (1997) (noting importers of defective products are held liable
under Article 3(2)).
37. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 3, § 3. See also Culhane, supra note 25, at 45
(stating suppliers are treated as producers unless they can identify producer of product
within reasonable time); HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 31-32 (asserting supplier is liable
unless he informs injured person identity of his own supplier within reasonable time).
The general rule in the United States is that parties in the distributive chain are liable
for strict product liability. See HENDERSON & TWERsKI, supra note 7, at 31 (noting parties
down distributive chain are liable). See also Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1 (N.J.
1975) (allowing plaintiff tojoin all members of distributive chain). Recent trends, how-
ever, have been to let retailers and wholesalers off the hook. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI,
supra note 7, at 142 (discussing retailer and wholesaler liability). See also Morrison v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 354 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1987) (holding that sellers are not liable
for defective products sold in sealed containers or under circumstances in which seller
could not inspect product).
38. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 4. See also, SIMON PEARL, EUROPEAN PRODUCT
LIABILITY 4243 (2000) (listing what claimant has to prove in strict liability case); How-
ELLS, supra note 17, at 35 (discussing plaintiff's case in context of Article 4).
39. See Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Pro-
tective Than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REv. 985, 994
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in Article 6, Section 1 of the Directive. 40 The Directive focuses
on the lack of safety that a person, regardless of whether that
person is producer or consumer, may expect from the product.4"
Thus, an objective, rather than a subjective test is used.4 2 Article
6(1) (b), however, stipulates that the product must have been
used in a reasonable way43 and (1) (c) includes the age of the
product as an additional factor.44 Article 6(2) further carves out
a "subsequent remedial measures" caveat, by providing that a
product is not defective merely because a better product is sub-
sequenfly put into circulation."
2. Defenses to Liability Under the Directive
Article 7 of the Directive sets out six defenses to strict prod-
(1998) (stating Directive adopts the consumer expectation standard); HODGES, supra
note 17, at 52 (observing consumer expectation test is adopted).
40. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 6, § 1 (defining defect). Article 6(1) of the
Directive provides:
A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is
entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would
be put; and
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.
Id. The Directive does not seem to differentiate between manufacturing and design
defects although the committee drafting the Directive did expressly indicate that Article
6(1) (a) would encompass failure to warn or instruct type defects. See Ferdinando Alba-
nese & Louis F. Del Duca, Developments in European Product Liability, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L.
193, 209 (1987) (noting committee did not wish to enumerate three types of defects but
did expressly indicate that incorrect or incomplete directions or use of warning would
be covered by the notion of defect); Taschner, supra note 36, at 30 (stating Directive
does not distinguish among three categories of defect).
41. See HODGES, supra note 17, at 52 (pointing out wording of Article 6 does not
distinguish between producer and consumer); Taschner, supra note 36, at 30 (re-
marking expectation is that of consumer).
42. See HODGES, supra note 17, at 52 (noting objective test on defectiveness is
adopted); Taschner, supra note 36, at 30 (stating concept of defect is objective one).
43. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 6, § 1 (b) (stipulating that reasonable expected
use must be considered). See also HODGES, supra note 17, at 54 (listing reasonably ex-
pected use as factor that must be considered); HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 38 (explain-
ing Directive covers reasonably expected use and foreseeable misuse).
44. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 6, § 1 (c) (providing that time product was put
into circulation must be considered). See also HODGES, supra note 17, at 54 (reporting
products that become dangerous after extensive use or after reasonable or state life
would not be found defective); Mildred, supra note 36, 436 (noting age of product is
one relevant factor in determining defectiveness).
45. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 6, § 2 (stating subsequent circulation of better
product does not mean that product in question is defective).
2004] TWO ROADS DIVERGED IN A YELLOW WOOD 1949
uct liability.46 Sections (a)-(c), and (f) provide that a producer is
not liable if: (a) he did not put the product in circulation; (b)
there was no defect when the product was put into circulation by
him; (c) he was not the producer; and (f) he was a component
manufacturer and the defect was attributable to the product in
which the component has been fitted.47 Section (d) accepts
compliance with mandatory regulations issued by public authori-
ties as a complete defense to strict liability.48
The development risk defense, set out in (e), is the most
controversial.49 Section (e) states:
The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if
he proves (e) that the state of scientific and technical knowl-
edge at the time when he put the product into circulation was
not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discov-
ered.5 °
The development risk defense was inserted as an optional provi-
sion which may be derogated by Member States.51
As of 1995, all Member States with the exception of France
46. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 7 (outlining defenses available under Direc-
tive).
47. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 7(a)-(c), (f) (exempting producer from liabil-
ity if he did not put product in circulation, if product was not defective at time of
circulation, if he was not producer, and if he was component manufacturer of defective
product containing component). See also, Mildred, supra note 36, 437 (discussing six
defenses available to defendant); HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 40-43 (outlining defenses
available under Directive).
48. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 7(d) (exonerating producers from liability if
they complied with "mandatory regulations"). See also, HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 42
(stating defect must have been due to compliance with mandatory standards). Compare
U.S. product liability law outlined in Restatement (Third) § 4(b) which states that "a
product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative regula-
tion .. . does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect." HENDERSON
& TWERSKI, supra note 7, at 572 (quoting Restatement (Third) and stating that majority of
states follow position set forth in § 4(b)).
49. See HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 39-40 (discussing controversy surrounding in-
clusion of defense); Christopher Hodges, Development Risks: Unanswered Questions, 61
MOD. L. REv. 560, 560 (1998) [hereinafter Hodges, Unanswered Questions] (noting that
development risks defense has aroused most interest); Linger, supra note 14, at 490
(commenting on controversial nature of development risk defense).
50. Directive, supra note 11, art. 7(e).
51. See HODGES, supra note 17, at 9 (noting that development risks defense is op-
tional); Linger, supra note 14, at 478-79 (discussing optional development risk defense
and proposing that defense become mandatory); Elizabeth C. Price, Toward a Unified
Theory of Products Liability: Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Thought, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 1277, 1340 (1994) (mentioning development risk defense is one of two optional
provisions from which Member States may derogate).
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had taken measures to implement the Directive.52 Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom included the
development risk defense;53 Spain included the defense though
excluded medicines, food or food products intended for human
consumption from its ambit;5 4 and Finland and Luxembourg ex-
52. See On the Application of Council Directive on the Approximation of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability
for Defective Products: First Report from the Commission of the European Communi-
ties, COM (95)617 final [hereinafter First Report] (commenting that all Member States
had taken measure to implement Directive with exception of France); Product Liability:
Commission Adopts Report on Defective Products, EUR. ENv'T, Jan. 8, 1996, at 468 (stating
France had not taken measure to incorporate Directive into national law).
53. See Austria: 99th Bundesgesetz vom 21.Jdnner 1988 fiber die Haftung ffir ein
fehlerhaftes Produkt [99th Federal Act of 21 January 1988 on the Liability for a Defec-
tive Product], § 8(2) (detailing exclusion of liability for development risks); Belgium:
Loi relative a la responsabilit6 du fait des produits defectueux du 25 fbvrier 1991 [Law
on the Civil Liability for Defective Products of 25 February 1992], art. 8(e) (providing
for development risk defense); Denmark: Lov nr. 371 af 7juni 1989 om produktansvar
[Law Concerning Products Liability of 7June 1989], ch. 3, § 7(4) (outlining exemption
from liability due to development risks); Germany: Gesetz fiber die Haftung ffir
fehlerhafte Produkte vom 15. Dezember 1989 [Law Concerning Liability for Defective
Products of 15 December 1989], § 1 (2) (5) (carving out exception to liability for devel-
opment risks) [hereinafter Germany's Product Liability Act]; Greece: Act no. 1961 of 3
September 1991 on Consumer Protection and Other Provisions, amended by Act No.
2000 of 24 December 1991, Government Gazette A 132, ch. 3, art. 10(e) (exonerating
producers of liability due to development risks); Ireland: An Bille um Dhliteanas I
Leith Tdtirgi Fabhtacha, 1991, Liability for Defective Products Bill, 1991, § 6(e) (ex-
empting producers from liability for development risks); Italy: Decreto del Presidente
della Repubblica 24 maggio 1988 n. 224 [Presidential Decree of 24 May 1988], art. 6,
§ 1 (e) (excluding liability for development risks); Netherlands: Produktenaansprake-
lijkheid [Product Liability Act], bk. 6, tit. 3, ch. 3, art. 185, § 1(e) (outlining develop-
ment risk defense); Portugal: Decreto-lei n.Q 383/89 de 6 de Novembro, [Decree -
Law no. 383.89 of 6 November 1989], art. 5(e) (providing development risk provision);
Sweden: Produktansvarslag SFS 1992:18, SFS 1992:1137 [Product Liability Act 1992:18]
as amended by 1992:1137, § 8(4) (allowing exception to liability for development risks);
United Kingdom: Consumer Protect Act 1987 [hereinafter Consumer Protection Act],
ch. 43, pt. 1, § 4(1) (e) (absolving producers of liability due to development risks). For
general information on Acts implementing the Directive, see HODGES, supra note 17
(translating and discussing acts of Member States implementing Directive); HOFFMAN &
HILL-ARNING, supra note 17 (outlining Member State implementation of Directive and
providing translated copies of national acts).
54. See Ley 22/1994, de 6 de Julio, Sobre Responsabilidad Civil por los Dafios
Causados por Productos Defectuosos [Law 22/1994 ofJuly 6 on Civil Liability for Dam-
ages Caused by Defective Products], B.O.E., No. 1597,July 7, 1994, art. 6, § 1 (e) [here-
inafter Spanish Product Liability Act] (providing exception to liability for development
risks); id. art. 6, § 3 (stating § 1(e) exoneration clause is not available for pharmaceuti-
cal products and food products intended for human consumption). See also Michael
Ansaldi, The Spanish Products Liability Act of 1994, 2 ILSAJ. IN-r'L. & CoMP. L. 371, 426-31
(1996) (providing translation of Spanish Liability Act).
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cluded the defense altogether.5
3. The Green Paper on Liability for Defective Products
In 1999, the European Commission adopted the Green Pa-
per on Liability for Defective Products. 56 The Green Paper, is-
sued to stimulate public discussion, had two aims: (1) to gather
information on the practical application of the Directive and de-
termine if its objectives were met; and (2) to gauge reactions to
possible revisions to the most sensitive points of the Directive.57
Among the issues considered were implementation of the devel-
opment risks defense and consideration of its abolition. 58  The
Green Paper specifically requested input on whether removal of
the development risk defense would discourage producers from
innovation, citing concern for the pharmaceutical industry, and
whether it would be feasible to insure against development
risks. 59 The Green Paper also asserted that whether or not to
include the development risk defense delayed the adoption of
the Directive by France.6 ° France ultimately joined the majority
of Member States in allowing a development risk defense apart
55. See Tuotevastuulaki Annettu Helsingissd 17 Pfaivnfna Elokuuta 1990 [Product
Liability Act of 17 August 1990], amended by Law Number 99 of 8 January 1993 and Law
Number 879 of 22 October 1993 [hereinafter Finnish Product Liability Act], § 7 (pro-
viding exemptions to liability); Loi du 21 avril 1989 relative A la responsabilit6 du fait
des produits d~fectueux [Law of 21 April 1989 on the Civil Liability for Defective Prod-
ucts], amended by Law of 6 December 1989, art. 4 [hereinafter Luxembourg's Product
Liability Act] (listing grounds by which producer may be exonerated from liability). See
also First Report, supra note 52, at 4 (noting national implementation of optional provi-
sions); Unforeseen Risk Aversion: Christopher Hodges Analyses a Court Victoy for UK Industry,
FIN. TIMES, June 10, 1997, at 18 (stating development risk defense had been imple-
mented by all member apart from Finland and Luxembourg with Spain excluding
medicines and food products).
56. Liability for Defective Products: Green Paper from the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, COM (1999) 396 final [hereinafter Green Paper].
57. See Green Paper, supra note 56, at 2 (explaining objectives of Green Paper,
which are to gather data on practical application of Directive to determine if goals were
met and to gauge reactions to possible revisions of Directive).
58. See id. at 3 (remarking implementation of development risk defense and assess-
ment of its possible abolition were considered).
59. See id. at 24-25 (reporting European Commission did not have all information
required to determine whether liability for development risks would prove to be insur-
mountable to producers and requesting information on application of development
risk defense with respect to impact on innovation and possibility of insurance).
60. See Hurd, supra note 27, at 61 (noting debate over possible inclusion of devel-
opment risk defense held up harmonization process); French Failure to Implement Direc-
tive, Bus. L. BRIEF, Feb. 1, 1993 (stating French implementation of Directive had been
stalled by disagreement over development risk defense).
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from products derived from the human body.61
The European Commission's Report in 2000 considered re-
actions to the Green Paper.6 2 Specifically, the Report consid-
ered data from the five Member States that allowed partial or
total liability for development risks.63 As of 2000, very little data
was available to determine the practical impact of imposing lia-
bility for development risks.6 4 An updated report is expected in
2005.65
In the meantime, the European Commission has appointed
Lovells, an international business law firm, to conduct a study
("Study") to determine the practical effects of the Directive on
product liability law in the EC.66 Twelve conclusions were made
based on the Study.6 7 Lovell's determined that the number of
product liability claims in the EC had increased noticeably in the
last ten years.68 The increase in claims was mainly attributed to
61. See Loi n 98-389 du 19 mai 1998 relatives a la responsabilit6 du fait des
produits d~fectueux, art. 12 [Law No. 98-389 of May 19, 1998 on the Civil Liability for
Defective Products] [hereinafter French Product Liability Act] (inserting art. 1386-11,
§4, development risk defense, into the French Civil Code, bk. III, tit. IV(A), art. 1386);
id. art. 13 (inserting art. 1386-12, exception to development risk defense, into the
French Civil Code, bk. III, tit. IV(A), art. 1386). See also Green Paper, supra note 56, at
24 (suggesting France allowed development risk defense with exception of products
derived from human body and those marketed before May 1998); PEARL, supra note 38,
at 11 (noting France does not allow liability for development risks apart from products
derived from human body).
62. On the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective Products:
Report from the Commission of the European Communities, COM(2000)893 final 7-8
[hereinafter Report].
63. See id. at 17-18 (reviewing information available with regard to five Member
States that either did not adopt the development risk defense or did so with excep-
tions). Data from Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain were reviewed.
Id.
64. See id. at 18. (declaring lack of data to determine impact of imposing liability
for development risks).
65. See id. at 36 (noting European Commission will present another report in
2005).
66. See Product Liability in the European Union: A Report for the European Com-
mission, MARKT/2001/11/D, Feb. 2003, i [hereinafter Lovell's Study] (giving back-
ground information related to commission of study). See also, John Meltzer, Reform of
Product Liability in the EU: New Report Finds General Satisfaction, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 42, 42
(2004) (referring to Lovell's appointment by European Commission to study function-
ing of Directive in EC).
67. See Lovell's Study, supra note 66, at 24-45 (summarizing findings and conclu-
sions).
68. See Lovell's Study, supra note 66, at 31 (noticing increase in number of product
liability claims in the last ten years); Meltzer, supra note 66, at 45 (reporting most par-
ticipants of survey thought number of product liability claims had increased).
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increased consumer awareness of rights, greater access to infor-
mation, and media activity, although the Directive contributed
as well.69 The Study also noted that product liability claims have
generally become more successful in the past ten years, with the
Directive contributing to that success.7" Overall, the Study re-
ported that 66% of all participants, 20% of consumers, 66% of
producers, 86% insurers, and 63% of regulators, lawyer and aca-
demics, felt that the Directive struck an appropriate balance be-
tween consumer protection and maintaining incentives for inno-
vation.7 1 The European Commission has undertaken a separate
study to determine the economic impact of removing the devel-
opment risk defense.72
B. Implementation of the Directive and the Development Risks Option
From the very beginning, there was a tension between the
two institutions7" responsible for drafting the Directive: 4 the
European Commission,7 5 which advocated strict liability for con-
69. See Lovell's Study, supra note 66, at 34 (attributing increase in claims to con-
sumer awareness of rights, consumer access to information and media activity with Di-
rective playing smaller role); Meltzer, supra note 66, at 45-46 (observing that three ma-
jor factors identified contributing to increase in claims are consumer awareness of
rights, greater access to information and media activity, with Directive identified as ma-
jor factor by 25% of participants).
70. See Lovell's Study, supra note 66, at 37 (noticing greater success in product
liability claims, attributable to Directive); Meltzer, supra note 66, at 46 (stating 50% of
participants thought product liability claims had been more successful).
71. See Lovell's Study, supra note 66, at 42-44 (explaining prevailing view was that
Directive struck appropriate balance between consumer protection and protecting
needs of producers or suppliers); Meltzer, supra note 66, at 48 (commenting on view of
66% of participants who thought Directive struck an appropriate balance).
72. See Lovell's Study, supra note 66, at vi (reporting separate study to determine
economic impact of removing development risk defense).
73. See HANLON, supra note 10, at 24 (listing five Community institutions, which
are European Commission, European Council of Ministers, European Court of Audi-
tors, European Court of Justice, and European Parliament); VINCENZI & FAIRHURST,
supra note 10, at 43 (describing five Community institutions).
74. See Culhane, supra note 25, at 28-29 (describing process of directive drafting,
consulting and adoption). See also SARAH L. CROFT & BEATRICE HARICHAUX DE TOURDON-
NET, THE EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY DIREcrIVE IN PRACTICE, FOR THE DEFENSE 13
(2000) (describing roles of European Institutions).
75. See Directive, supra note 11, at pmbl. (identifying Article 100 of Treaty estab-
lishing European Economic Community, which specifies that "[t]he Council shall, act-
ing unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the ap-
proximation of such laws," as the source of legislative power); Culhane, supra note 25,
at 28 (remarking that European Commission of EC drafts proposals for directives); An-
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sumer protection v6 and the European Parliament, 77 which
voiced its discomfort in imposing liability for risks that the manu-
facturer could not have known about. 78 In the end, a compro-
mise was reached that provided the Article 7(e) "development
risk" defense to the general rule of strict liability. 79 Therefore, a
manufacturer may escape liability by showing that given the ex-
isting scientific and technological knowledge at the time of the
product's circulation, the defect could not have been discov-
ered. o
In a community of fifteen countries with legal systems that
reflect a diversity of culture,"' an agreement was made to harmo-
nize product liability law irrespective of the varying levels of con-
sumer protection already established in each individual coun-
try.8 2 Where the Member States have diverged is in their imple-
dreas P. Reindl, Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code: Consumer Contracts
and European Community Law, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 627, 642-43(1997) (noting European
Commission has exclusive right to propose Community acts).
76. See Stapleton, Bugs in Products Liability, supra note 34, at 1245 (reporting Euro-
pean Commission strongly preferred imposition of strict liability); The Right
Honourable The Lord Griffiths, M.C. et al., Developments in English Product Liability Law:
A Comparison with the American System, 62 TUL. L. REV. 353, 362-63 (stating European
Commission favored strict liability for defective products); Reindl, supra note 75, at 644
(noting among Community institutions, European Parliament is probably most pro-
consumers).
77. See Culhane, supra note 25, at 29 (noting European Council has power to
adopt proposal into law but must consult with European Parliament before doing so);
VINCENZI & FAIRHuRST, supra note 10, at 79-80 (describing legislative procedure for pol-
icy areas relating to approximation of national laws). The European Parliament serves
an advisory role to the Council of Ministers, which has ultimate authority to adopt the
final version of the directive. See id.
78. See Culhane, supra note 25, at 31 (remarking that European Parliament was
concerned about imposing liability for development risks); Stapleton, Bugs in Products
Liability, supra note 34, at 1231 n.32 (citing European Parliament's concern about im-
posing liability for development risks).
79. See Culhane, supra note 25, at 31 (asserting industry-friendly compromise was
reached by including development risk defense); Stapleton, Bugs in Products Liability,
supra note 34, at 1248 (stating that purpose of allowing development risk defense,
against wishes of European Commission, was to protect industry).
80. See Culhane, supra note 25, at 31 (citing development risk defense); Stapleton,
Bugs in Products Liability, supra note 34, at 1248 (referring to development risk defense).
81. See Collette B. Cunningham, In Defense of Member State Culture: The Unrealized
Potential of Article 151(4) of the EC Treaty and the Consequences for EC Cultural Policy, 34
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 119, 121 (2001) (noting fifteen Member States have distinct cultural
identity); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1,
18 (2003) (observing Europeans and their legal cultures are not homogeneous).
82. See generally, HODGES, supra note 17 (laying out product liability law in Member
States before and after implementation of the Directive); HOFFMAN & HILL-ARNING,
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mentation of the development risk defense.8" Two countries,
Finland and Luxembourg, have chosen not to implement the
defense84 while three countries, France, Spain and the United
Kingdom have deviated from the rest of the Member States in
their implementation of the defense.85
1. Finland
Finnish product liability law grew from the contractual rela-
tionship between seller and buyer.86 Nordic countries like Fin-
land adopted the culpa theory of contractual responsibility,
supra note 17 (surveying Member States' product liability law before and after imple-
mentation of the Directive); KELLY & ATFREE, supra note 17 (comparing product liabil-
ity law before and after implementation of Directive in Member States).
83. See Report, supra note 62, at 16-17 (outlining varying implementation of devel-
opment risk defense in Member States). See also Linger, supra note 14, at 491 (arguing
that development risk defense should be mandatory in order to promote innovation).
84. See Finnish Product Liability Act, supra note 55, § 7 (exonerating producers
from liability in certain situations but imposing liability for development risks); Luxem-
bourg's Product Liability Act, supra note 55, art. 4 (allowing exceptions to liability but
none for development risks). See also First Report, supra note 52, at 4 (noting Finland
and Luxembourg excluded development risk defense).
85. See French Product Liability Act, supra note 61, art. 12 (exonerating producers
from liability due to development risk); id. art. 13 (conditioning development risk de-
fense on action by producer to make provisions to prevent consequence of defect);
Spanish Product Liability Act, supra note 54, art. 6, § 1 (e) (providing development risks
defense); id. art. 6, § 3 (stating Section 1(e) exoneration clause is not available for
pharmaceutical products and food products intended for human consumption); Con-
sumer Protection Act, supra note 53, ch. 43, pt. 1, § 4(1) (e) (absolving producers of
liability due to development risks). Strict liability for pharmaceutical products had ex-
isted since 1978 in Germany under the Pharmaceutical Products Act. See Gesetz fiber
den Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln v. 24.8.1976 (BGB1. I S. 2445) in der Fassung der
Bekanntmachung v. 19.10.1994 (BGB1.I S. 3018), zuletzt geandert durch Ges. v. 25.
Februar 1998 (BGB1. I S. 374) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Products Act]. See also Re-
port, supra note 62, at 16-18 (noting exception to development risk defense in Ger-
many); Taschner, note 36, at 27 (reporting Germany included development risk liabil-
ity for every pharmaceutical producer regardless of fault). It is therefore not surprising
that Germany excluded the development risk defense for pharmaceutical products. See
Germany's Product Liability Act, supra note 53, § 15 (exempting products that fall
under Pharmaceutical Products Act from provisions of Germany's Product Liability
Act); Report, supra note 62, at 16-17 (noting exception to development risk defense in
Germany). Germany's implementation of the development risk defense will not be dis-
cussed in this Note. For information on Germany's product liability law, see Manfred
Wandt, German Approaches to Product Liability, 34 TEx. INT'L L.J. 71 (1999) (providing
information on Germany's Product Liability Act and Pharmaceutical Products Act).
86. See Consumer Protection Act 39/1978, ch. 5, § 1(1), available at http://www.
finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E9780038.PDF (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) (limiting provisions
of chapter to sale of goods where seller is a business and buyer is consumer). See also
HODGES, supra note 17, at 292 (observing product liability in Finland originated from
sale of goods concepts applicable between seller and buyer).
1956 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURATAL [Vol. 27:1940
which is liability based on negligence on the part of the seller.8 7
Finnish product liability was made up of two components: (1)
the manufacturer's obligation to make his product as safe as is
reasonable possible given available technology; and (2) the man-
ufacturer's obligation to warn potential buyers of inherent risks
in the use of the product, known to the manufacturer but not
the public at large."8 Finland implemented the Directive by
adopting the Law of April 21, 1989 on the Civil Liability for De-
fective Products. 89 In advocating strict product liability without
an exception for development risks, the consumer movement ar-
gued that including the defense would allow manufacturers to
raise the defense as a tactical move regardless of the merits.9 °
Consumer advocates asserted that justice would be hindered be-
cause consumers unable to foot the legal fees would drop suits
or settle for less than reasonable amounts.91 In the. end, the de-
velopment risk defense was not included.9 2
2. Luxembourg
Prior to implementation of the Directive, the contract law of
warranty protected consumers from harmful products in Luxem-
bourg.9 3 Sellers were required to guarantee against latent de-
fects.9 4 The rule of privity governed claims brought for defects
87. See HODGES, supra note 17, at 293 (stating Nordic culpa theory of liability was
based on seller negligence); HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 154 (reporting consumers re-
lied on negligence principles for product liability).
88. See HODGES, supra note 17, at 295 (describing two components of Finnish prod-
uct liability - manufacturer's obligation to make product safe given available technol-
ogy and obligation to warn of inherent risks in use of product).
89. See Finnish Product Liability Act, supra note 55 (providing strict liability for
defective products in Finland). See HODGES, supra note 17, at 296 (noting implement-
ing act and date on which legislation came into force); PEARL, supra note 38, at 11
(providing information on Finnish implementation of Directive).
90. See HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 157 (describing arguments made by consumer
movement).
91. See id. (outlining arguments made by consumer movement).
92. See Finnish Product Liability Act, supra note 55, § 7 (providing exceptions to
liability but none for development risks). See also HODGES, supra note 17, at 296 (noting
Finland excluded defense); PEARL, supra note 38, at 11 (observing Finland imposes lia-
bility for development risks).
93. See HODGES, supra note 17, at 474 (stating Consumer Protection Act prevented
contractual excluding or limiting of liability); Taschner, note 36, at 26 (explaining Lux-
embourg law is same as French law and describing contractual liability under Article
1645 of sales law of Code).
94. See HODGES, supra note 17, at 474 (noting any seller must guarantee against
defects which are not discoverable by due diligence); HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 178
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and anyone not in privity with the seller had to seek damages in
tort.9 5 The Directive was implemented in Luxembourg through
the Act of April 21, 1989 on Civil Liability for Defective Prod-
ucts.96 The development risk defense was excluded after some
debate between the Judicial Commission of Luxembourg and
the Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce.97 The Chamber of
Commerce argued that the exclusion of the defense would put
Luxembourg in a disadvantageous position for inter-EU trade,
inhibit innovation and penalize industries that developed new
products. 8 The Luxembourg Parliament, fearful that the devel-
opment risk defense would erode consumer protections,99 ex-
cluded the defense. 00
3. France
Prior to the passing of the European Directive, France was
the leader in the movement towards strict liability for prod-
(explaining clauses limiting or excluding liability for hidden defects were made invalid
by law).
95. See HODGES, supra note 17, at 475 (stating persons not in privity with producer
may sue latter in tort); MICHELLE FONTAINE & THIERRY BOURGOIGNIE, CONSUMER LEGIS-
LATION IN BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG 210 (Michael Corkery trans., 1982) (noting Article
1382 imposes liability on sellers and third parties).
96. Luxembourg's Product Liability Act, supra note 55. See also HODGES, supra
note 17, at 475 (noting implementing act and date on which legislation came into
force); PEARL, supra note 38, at 11 (providing information on implementation of Direc-
tive in Luxembourg).
97. See Projet de Loi relatif a la responsabilit( civile du fait des produits d~fectueux
[Proposed law concerning the civil liability of manufacturers of defective products],
Chambre des Deputes, No. 3287, at 4-5 (Mar. 1, 1989) (Lux.) [hereinafter Luxem-
bourg's Proposed Law] (outlining debate between Judicial Commission of Luxembourg
and Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce). See also Linger, supra note 14, at 498-99
(describing positions of Judicial Commission and Chamber of Commerce).
98. See Luxembourg's Proposed Law, supra note 97, at 9-10 (arguing imposition of
liability for development risk disincentivizes innovation by penalizing producers of new
products and puts Luxembourg at disadvantage for inter-EU trade). See also Linger,
supra note 14, at 499 (stating excluding defense would put Luxembourg at trade disad-
vantage by isolating it from rest of Member States and discourage innovation of new
products).
99. See Luxembourg's Proposed Law, supra note 97, at 4-5 (reportingJudicial Com-
mission did not want to erode consumer protection); Linger, supra note 14, at 498
(explaining development risks defense was rejected because Judicial Commission
feared it would erode consumer protection).
100. See Luxembourg's Product Liability Act, supra note 55, art. 4 (exempting pro-
ducers from liability but not for development risks). See also HODGES, supra note 17, at
296 (noting Luxembourg excluded defense); PEARL, supra note 38, at 11 (observing
Luxembourg imposes liability for development risks).
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ucts. l0 ' Exceeding even the early U.S. approach of res ipsa loqui-
tur, the French Cour de Cassation established an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of manufacturer negligence.10 2 The effects of the pre-
sumption were muted by French tort law, however, which did
not consider buyers to be proper plaintiffs.1 l 3 Tort actions could
only be brought by non-purchasing third parties only;104 buyers
were required to sue under contract theory.10 5 Under the Civil
Code, warranty law applied to products cases10 6 and was in fact
more generous to injured plaintiffs than the U.S. Uniform Com-
mercial Code.0 7 Most notably, a lack of privity is not a bar in
mass-marketing situations and plaintiffs were not limited to the
price of replacement of the defective good for damages.'0 8
The development risk defense caused great controversy in
101. See Freedman, supra note 29, at 16 (declaring movement towards strict liabil-
ity was led by France); HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 101 (pointing out among Member
States, France had most protective product liability law prior to Directive).
102. See, e.g., Cass. Civ., July 22, 1931: [1931] II Gaz. Pal. 683 (holding that mar-
keting of defective products is sufficient proof of manufacturer's fault). See also
Culhane, supra note 25, at 21 (remarking Cour de Cassation established irrebuttable pre-
sumption of manufacturer negligence); HODGES, supra note 17, at 323 (summarizing
French High Court has consistently held for more than fifty years that mere marketing
of defective products constitute proof of manufacturer fault).
103. See CODE CIVIL art. 1384 (2000 ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 2000) (Fr.) [hereinaf-
ter C. Civ.], translated in, THE CODE NAPOLEON 274-75 (Bryant Barrett trans. 1999). See
also Culhane, supra note 25, at 21 (noting proper plaintiffs under tort sections do not
include buyer, who must sue under contract law); Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 40,
at 199 (stating injured non-purchaser must act in tort).
104. See C. Civ., supra note 103, art. 1384 (providing action in tort). See also
Culhane, supra note 25, at 21 (noting tort section only apply to nonpurchasing third
parties); Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 40, at 199 (stating injured non-purchaser
must act in tort).
105. See C. Civ., supra note 103, art. 1641 (establishing actions under warranty
law). See Culhane, supra note 25, at 21 (remarking buyers had to sue under contract
theory); Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 40, at 199 (explaining non-purchaser may sue
in tort).
106. See C. Civ., supra note 103, art. 1641 (offering warranties against defective
products).
107. See Culhane, supra note 25, at 22 (pointing out French Civil Code is more
generous than U.S. Uniform Commercial Code to plaintiffs because lack of privity does
not bar claims in mass-marketing situations and plaintiffs are not limited to purchase
price of defective goods for damages).
108. See Culhane, supra note 25, at 22 (observing plaintiffs in mass-marketing situa-
tions have been permitted to proceed against manufacturer directly, in spite of lack of
privity); HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 106 (asserting French contract law overcomes priv-
ity of contract hurdle by allowing actions directes by sub-purchasers); HOWELLS, supra
note 17, at 103-04 (describing how French system allows plaintiff to receive consequent-
ial damages cause by product).
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France and resulted in delays in the adoption of the Directive.' 0 9
On the one hand, allowing for a development risk defense was
contrary to French jurisprudence, which held producers respon-
sible for unknown defects, even if the producer was able to prove
that the defect was not discoverable at the time the product was
put into circulation. 1 0 Commentators further argued that the
defense would incentivize willful blindness on the part of manu-
facturers or cause manufacturers to adopt a code of silence re-
garding defective products, thereby undermining consumer pro-
tection."1 ' On the other hand, the Conseil National du Patronat
Francais was concerned that a French exclusion of the defense,
would undermine the Directive's objective of harmonization and
would encourage forum shopping. 2 Additionally, there was at
least some precedent for a development risk defense, France
having allowed the defense for pharmaceuticals. 1 After much
109. See Hurd, supra note 27, at 61 (noting debate over possible inclusion of devel-
opment risk defense held up harmonization process); French failure to implement directive,
supra note 60 (stating French implementation of Directive had been stalled by disagree-
ment over development risk defense).
110. See Linger, supra note 14, at 501 (noting French jurisprudence provides that
producer is responsible for unknown defects regardless of whether defect was discovera-
ble at time product was put into circulation); HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 102 (discuss-
ing Article 1641 which made sellers liable for hidden defects and stating undiscover-
ability of defect was not defense on general principles).
111. See Rothman & Finon, Responsabilitg du fait des Produits: Vers le Dgveloppement
d'un Regime Defectueux, 124 FICHESJURIDIQUES 6 (1988) (Institute for Consumer Affairs,
France, Pub. No. 610) (expressing concern that development risk defense will under-
mine consumer protection by providing incentive for manufacturers to be willfully
blind or remain silent about defective products); Linger, supra note 14, at 501-02 (cit-
ing commentators' concern that fear of liability will cause producers to adopt code of
silence regarding defective products).
112. See Simon, Observations des Professionnels sur l'introduction en Droit Fran-
cais de la Directive Europ~enne la Responsabilit6 du Fait des Produits Dffectueux [Pro-
fessional Observations on the Introduction in French Law of the European Directive on
the Responsibility of Defective Products], at 198 (reporting Conseil Nationals concern
that development risk defense would create competitive distortions in EU thereby un-
dermining product liability law harmonization and encouraging forum shopping); Lin-
ger, supra note 14, at 502 (explaining Conseil Nationars argument that optional develop-
ment risks defense would cause competitive distortions among producers of EC and
would undermine product liability law harmonization and encourage forum shopping
by injured consumers).
113. See Hurd, supra note 27, at 61 (noting pre-Directive French law imposed liabil-
ity for development risks with exception of pharmaceuticals); Anne E. Wells, Regulating
Experimental AIDS Drugs: A Comparison of the United States and France, 13 Loy. L.A. Ir'L &
CoMP. L.J. 393, 408 (1990) (citing 1973 decision where French court held that pro-
ducer distributing product which carries risks but is only treatment available is not neg-
ligent).
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debate, France opted in on the development risk defense.1"4
The draft implementing -act cited the chilling effect on research
and development, and the disadvantageous position France
would be in compared to European competitors if it were to opt
out of the defense as reasons for France's acquiescence to the
defense. 1 5
France finally incorporated the Directive into national law
on May 19, 1998.116 Although France conceded to the develop-
ment risk defense, the controversy surrounding the defense did
not subside.1 17 Article 1386-12 of the French Civil Code provides
that a producer must prove that he has taken the steps appropri-
ate to avert the harmful consequences of a defective product in
order to invoke the development risk defense."' The develop-
114. See French Product Liability Act, supra note 61, art. 12 (implementing devel-
opment risk defense). See also Green Paper, supra note 56, at 34 (reporting France
ultimately allowed development risk defense with exception of products derived from
human body); PEARL, supra note 38, at 11 (stating France does not allow liability for
development risks apart from products derived from human body).
115. See HODGES, supra note 17, at 327 (discussing preamble of Draft Act as being
concerned with impairment of research and development and European competition
resulting from Member States, should development risk defense be excluded); How-
ELLS, supra note 17, at 117 (stating French industry convinced government to include
defense since France's major trading partners had almost unanimously opted in on
defense).
116. French Product Liability Act, supra note 61. See Defective Products: Proceedings
Against Paris and Athens for Poor Transposition ofEU Directive, EUR. REP., Jan. 19, 2000, at
2467 [hereinafter EUROPEAN REPORT] (noting date Directive was transposed into na-
tional law in France). See also Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Commission of
the European Communities v. French Republic, Case C-52/00, [2001] E.C.R. _, at 1 7
(identifying French legislation transposing Directive into national law).
117. See also Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, French Republic, (2001] E.C.R.
_ (representing debate between Commission and French Republic on how to apply
development risk defense).
118. See French Product Liability Act, supra note 61, art. 13 (inserting Article 1386-
12 into French Civil Code). Article 1386-12, 2 states:
Le producteur ne peut invoquer les causes d'exon~ration prevues aux 4Q et 59
de l'article 1386-11 si, en presence d'un d~faut qui s'est rv616 dans un d~lai
de dix ans apros la mise en circulation du produit, il n'a pas pris les disposi-
tions propres f en pr~venir les consequences dommageables [The producer
cannot call upon the causes of exemption of article 1386-11 if, in the presence
of a defect which appeared within ten year after putting into circulation of the
product, it did not make the provisions suitable to prevent the detrimental
consequences of them].
Id. See also Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, French Republic, [2001] E.C.R. _, at
10 (asserting French Republic has failed to fulfill its obligations under Directive by
providing that development risk defense applies only in cases where producer had
taken appropriate steps to avert harmful consequences of defective product in Article
1386-12 of Civil Code).
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mental risk defense, however, as defined by the Directive, is not
a conditional defense 1 9 After the European Commission failed
to resolve the issue through an exchange of letters with France's
Permanent Representative, it brought action against the French
Republic for failing to fulfill its obligation under the Directive
and under the EC Treaty.
a20
The French Government justified its actions on three
grounds. 121 It argued first that the European Commission is it-
self considering an amendment to exclude the development risk
defense.' 22 Second, the Directive gives Member States a certain
amount of flexibility in the implementation of the optional pro-
vision.123 Third, the obligation imposed by Article 1386-12 is ex-
plicitly laid down in another directive, the General Product
119. See EUROPEAN REPORT, supra note 116, at 2467 (stating French legislation did
not comply with Directive because liability exemption for development risk was condi-
tioned on preventive measures taken by producer). See also Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Geelhoed, French Republic, [2001] E.C.R. -, at 10 (asserting French Republic has
failed to fulfill its obligations under Directive by providing that development risk de-
fense applies only in cases where producer had taken appropriate steps to avert harmful
consequences of defective product in Article 1386-12 of Civil Code).
120. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, French Republic, [2001] E.C.R. _.
See generally, EUROPEAN REPORT, supra note 116, at 2467 (describing proceedings against
France for failure to implement Directive). The responsibility of sanctioning for non-
implementation of directives adopted by the EC fall to the European Court of Justice of
the European Communities. See HANLON, supra note 10, at 58 (stating Court prevents
Member States from neglecting duties of implementation of legislation); VINCENZI &
FAiR-HURST, supra note 10, at 127 (noting Court is responsible for ruling on validity and
interpretation of acts of institutions, including directives). The European Court ofJus-
tice is a Community institution with purely judicial functions whose purpose is to en-
sure "that the law is observed in the interpretation and applications of the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and of the provisions laid down by the compe-
tent Community institutions." Jurisdiction of the European Court ofJustice, European
Court ofJustice website, available at http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/instit/presentationfr/
index.htm. See also, HANLON, supra note 10, at 57-58 (explaining role of European
Court of Justice to be in ensuring effectiveness of Community law). In interpreting
Community law, the European Court of Justice must carefully accommodate the back-
ground of differing legal systems of the Member States on the one hand, while supple-
menting Community law with national law when necessary on the other. See Freedman,
supra note 29, at 3, 7; VINCENZI & FAMRHURST, supra note 10, at 127 (noting EC Treaty
envisioned partnership between European Court of Justice and national court).
121. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, French Republic, [2001] E.C.R. _ at
83 (outlining French Republic's arguments).
122. See id. (arguing European Commission itself is considering amending devel-
opment risk defense).
123. See id. (asserting Directive allows some freedom in implementation develop-
ment risk defense).
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Safety Directive, 124 which imposed an obligation on producers to
monitor products which are sold. 125 In response, the European
Commission stated that the development risk defense did not
conflict with the General Product Safety Directive, which is con-
cerned with the general obligations of producers to ensure the
safety of their products. 126 Furthermore, the European Commis-
sion noted that the action for failure to implement a provision
cannot be decided on possible future amendments to the Direc-
12712tive. Advocate General ("AG") Geelhoed 28 sided with the Eu-
ropean Commission, stating that "a Member State's obligations
under Community law must be determined by reference to the
state of Community law on the date when the action was
124. Council Directive No. 92/59, O.J. L 228/24 at 24-32 (1992). More recently, a
newly revised Directive on General Product Safety ("revised GPS") was adopted, to be
transposed into national legislation by January 2004. Council Directive No. 2001/95,
OJ. L 11/4, at 4-17 (2002). The revised GPS Directive does not cover food safety,
which is now regulated by Council Regulation No. 178/2002, O.J. L 31/1, at 1-24
(2002). The revised GPS better defines appropriate safety specifications corresponding
to the concept of "safe" products. For information on the revised GPS Directive, see
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons-safe/prodsafe/gpsd/indexen.htm.
125. See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, French Republic, [2001] E.C.R. - at
83. The French Republic argued:
The French Government finds it incomprehensible that the exemption should
not be subject to the obligation to monitor products which are sold, since that
would be a logical complement to the safety principle. The French Govern-
ment concludes that such an obligation is explicitly laid down in Directive 92/
59 and that it also entails an obligation to ensure that products are traceable,
an obligation to keep up to date with new scientific developments, and an
obligation to inform those individuals who are exposed to them of new risks
which have come to light.
Id.
126. See id. at 84 (stating European Commission's rebuttal that General Product
Safety Directive concerns general obligations regarding safety rather than imposing lia-
bility for defective products).
127. See id. (noting European Commission's rebuttal that actions for failure to ful-
fill obligations cannot be based on ongoing debates about future amendments).
128. See HANLON, supra note 10, at 58 (observing European Court of Justice is
made up of fifteen judges and nine Advocate Generals); VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra
note 10, at 93 (remarking that fifteen judges and nine Advocate Generals make up
European Court of Justice). The European Court of Justice consists of fifteen judges
assisted by nine Advocates Generals. See id. One Advocate General ("AG") is assigned
to each case. See HANLON, supra note 10, at 59 (noting one AG is assigned to each case);
VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra note 10, at 95-96 (stating each case will have one AG).
The function of the AG is to issue a written opinion setting out the applicable law to the
case and recommending to the European Court of Justice how the case ought to be
decided. See HANLON, supra note 10, at 59-60 (describing advisory role of AG in Court
of Justice); VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra note 10, at 95-96 (discussing role of AG as
outlining applicable law and recommending course of action to Court of Justice).
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brought."'129 As a result, the AG concluded that the French Re-
public failed to comply fully with the Directive. 3 ° Pursuant to
the AG's recommendation, 13 1 the European Court of Justice
ruled that France had failed to fulfill its obligations under the
Directive. 3 2 As of July 2003, France had yet to comply with the
European Court of Justice's judgment of April 2002.13
4. Spain
Spanish contract-based product liability allowed two distinct
rights of action, under the law of sales and the obligations the-
ory. 134 The obligations theory, as described in Article 1101 of the
Spanish Civil Code, made a seller liable for damages and harms
caused through negligence. 135 Article 1484 further held sellers
129. Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, French Republic, [2001] E.C.R. - at
87 (finding French government's defense unconvincing).
130. See id. at 86, 89 (reporting AG's conclusion that France failed to comply
with Directive). See also Internal Market: Commission Moves Against 13 Member States for
Failure to Implement EU Legislation, Commission Press Release, IP/03/1005, 4 (July 14,
2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/spp/rapid.html [hereinafter Inter-
nal Market (uly 14, 2003)] (mentioning European Court of Justice found French Prod-
uct Liability Act did not conform to Directive); Internal Market: Commission protects the
free movement of goods and services in France, Italy and the Netherlands, Commission Press
Release, IP/03/581 2 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/
spp/rapid.html [hereinafter Internal Market (Apr. 28, 2003)] (declaring French Product
Liability Act provisions were incompatible with Directive).
131. See HANLON, supra note 10, at 60 (noting Court follows AG's opinion in major-
ity of cases); VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra note 10, at 96 (noting AG's opinion is fol-
lowed by European Court in vast majority of cases). In the majority of cases, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice follows the opinion of the AG although the opinion is not bind-
ing. Id. In 1988, the European Court of First Instance was created to bring relief to an
overburdened European Court ofJustice. See HANLON, supra note 10, at 60 (discussing
Court of First Instance); VINCENZI & FAIRHURST, supra note 10, at 120 (mentioning crea-
tion of Court of First Instance).
132. See Judgment of the Court of Apr. 25 2002, Commission v. French Republic,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-3827, at 1 49 (holding France failed to fulfill its obligation under Direc-
tive).
133. See Internal Market (July 14, 2003), supra note 130, at 4 (stating European
Commission will be sending France reasoned opinion given its failure to comply with
European Court ofjustice's 2002judgment despite being sent letter of formal notice by
European Commission); Internal Market (Apr. 28, 2003), supra note 130, at 1 (citing
France's failure to comply with European Court of Justice's judgment of April 25,
2002).
134. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 378 (discussing two forms in which claim may be
advanced through contract theory); HODGES, supra note 17, at 585-87 (explaining two
aspects of contractual liability under Spanish law: civil law and special law of mercantile
obligations).
135. See CODIGO CIVIL art. 1101 (Sp.), translated in, CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN 274 (Julio
Romanach, Jr. trans., 1994) [hereinafter C.C.] (stating "those who, in the performance
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responsible for latent product defects regardless of whether sell-
ers were aware of the defect; in other words, strictly liable.1 16
Under the obligations theory, sellers were liable for injuries fore-
seeable at the time the obligation arose, thereby excluding liabil-
ity arising from development risks.
13 7
As with other countries, contract based claims were limited
to those in privity.131 Those not in privity with the seller had to
sue in tort.1 39 Article 1902, which outlines fault-based liability,
provided a claim based on negligence. 4 ' Similar to the
French,14 ' the Spanish courts created a presumption of seller
negligence,142 which in effect reversed the burden of proof forc-
ing sellers to prove lack of fault. 143 The Spanish took a more
of their obligations, incur ... negligence... are liable for the resulting damages"). See
also Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 378-79 (describing obligations theory of contracts).
136. See C.C., supra note 135, art. 1484 (stating "the seller is obligated to give war-
ranty for the hidden defects that the thing sold may have, if such defects render the
thing unsuitable for the use to which it is destined"). See also Ansaldi, supra note 54, at
379 (explaining sellers are responsible for latent defects under law of sales); HODGES,
supra note 17, at 585 (citing Article 1484 as making seller liable for hidden defects in
good being sold).
137. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 380 (noting foreseeability in obligations theory
excludes liability from development risks); GERD BRUGGEMANN, DIE PRODUKTHAFTUNG
IM SPANISCHEN RECHT 91 (1988) (remarking producers are not liable for development
risks under obligations theory because of foreseeability element required for liability).
138. See C.C. art. 1257 (stipulating contractual obligations are between contracting
parties and their heirs only). See also Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 381 (commenting privity
requirement is obvious drawback to contract theory); HODGES, supra note 17, at 586
(citing Article 1257 as forbidding third party damaged by defective product to sue pro-
ducer directly).
139. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 381 (noting plaintiffs must recover under tort
theory if not in privity of contract with their defendant); HODGES, supra note 17, at 587
(outlining basis by which non-contractual liability may be imposed).
140. See C.C. art. 1902 (providing cause of action for damages caused by fault or
negligence). See also Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 381 (describing liability under tort law);
HODGES, supra note 17, at 587 (explaining Article 1902 requires existence of negligence
for non-contractual liability).
141. See Culhane, supra note 25, at 21 (asserting Cour de Cassation established ir-
rebuttable presumption of manufacturer negligence); HODGES, supra note 17, at 323
(observing French High Court has held for more than fifty years that mere marketing
of defective products constitute proof of manufacturer fault).
142. See, e.g., Judgment of the Supreme Court of June 22, 1931 (noting presump-
tion of negligence in extra-contractual liability). See also Ramon Mullerat & Sonia Cor-
tes, Spain, in EUROPEAN PRODuc-rs LIABILITY 339, 348 (Patrick Kelly & Rebecca Attree
eds., 1992) (reporting presumption of negligence by producer).
143. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 382 (noting Spanish courts inverted burden of
proof, requiring defendant to prove diligence); HODGES, supra note 17, at 588 (describ-
ing reversal in burden of proof in Spanish jurisprudence which requires defendant to
prove lack of guilt).
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pro-consumer stance by making the presumption rebuttable. 144
The major event that spurred the review of consumer protection
law and resulted in the passing of the General Law for the De-
fense of Consumers and Users ("GAC") was the "Toxic Oil Syn-
drome" of 1981 in which over four hundred people died or be-
came seriously ill from ingesting reprocessed industrial rapeseed
oil marketed for cooking and consumption. 145 The GAC codi-
fied existing Spanish jurisprudence, like the rebuttable presump-
tion of fault and set up a strict liability regime in Spain. 14 6 Every-
one in the production and distribution chain was held strictly
liable. 147 The GAC was severely criticized for sloppy draftsman-
ship but nevertheless signified a major advance for Spanish con-
sumers.
148
It took Spain nine years and four drafts4 9 to implement the
Directive in what is now the Spanish Products Liability Act of
1994 ("SPLA"). 15° The inclusion of the development risk de-
144. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 382 (stating presumption of producer fault was
subject to rebuttal); Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 142, at 348 (observing rebuttable
presumption of producer fault).
145. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 383 n.69 (describing incident where denatured
industrial grade oil was sold for consumption). See also HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 184
(discussing 'Colza oil disaster where industrial grade oil was denatured and distributed
as cooking oil); Richard Lorant, Mass Poisoning in Spain Still Steeped in Mystery, L.A.
TIMES,June 16, 1991, at A6 (commenting on Spanish rapeseed oil incident where dena-
tured industrial grade oil was sold as cooking oil). Ansaldi asserts that the Los Alfaques
disaster of 1978, in which a tanker carrying 23,000 kilos of liquid propylene gas crashed
into a campsite wall exploding and killing 215 campers was also significant in forcing
Spanish law makers to review consumer protection laws. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at
383 n.69 (describing Los Alfaques disaster where tanker carrying propylene gas crashed
and exploded killing campers); Fay Willey, A Scene Out of Dante, NEWSWEEK, July 24,
1978, at 53 (reporting on Los Alfaques disaster where hundreds were killed when
tanker carrying propylene gas crashed and exploded).
146. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 387-88 (discussing Article 26 of General Law for
the Defense of Consumers and Users ("GAC")); Paloma Peman Domecq, Products Lia-
bility in Spain, 15 COMP. L.Y.B. INT'L Bus. 137, 140 (1993) (noting if defendant proves
absence of negligence, he is exonerated from liability).
147. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 388 (stating that liable parties included almost
everyone in production and distribution chain); HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 185 (dis-
cussing Article 27 providing for allocation of liability).
148. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 389 (criticizing sloppy draftsmanship of GAG);
HODGES, supra note 17, at 589 (noting GAC is ambiguous and difficult to interpret
when it comes to limits or exclusions of liability).
149. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 387-88 (noting first two drafts were prepared in
1988 and SPLA was finally promulgated in 1994); Domecq, supra note 146, at 158-59
(describing four drafts of SPLA).
150. Spanish Product Liability Act, supra note 54. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 375
n.18 (noting implementing act and date on which legislation came into force); PEARL,
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fense was, of course, in contention.15' The limited acceptance of
the development risk defense is believed to be due to the
Thalidomide crisis that shook Europe and to the Toxic Oil Syn-
drome. 15 2  In the end, Spain decided to allow a partial de-
fense. 5  The SPLA allows for a development risk defense 5 4 ex-
cept as to "pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food products
intended for human consumption." 55
5. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the duty to non-consumers was rec-
ognized when the rule of privity was abandoned by Donoghue v.
Stevenson.' 56 Donoghue allowed a fault-based cause of action for
supra note 38, at 11 (noting date of adoption of Spanish national product liability law).
For detailed information on the Spanish Products Liability Act, see Antonio J. Vela
Sanchez, Products Liability in Spain, 32 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 979 (2001) (reviewing provi-
sions of Spanish Products Liability Act of 1994).
151. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 397-98 (noting disagreements between Ministry
of Justice, proposing to allow development risk defense except for pharmaceutical
products, and Ministry of Health and Consumption, which wanted to exclude both
medicines and food from defense); Domecq, supra note 146, at 158-59 (stating Ministry
of Justice sought to exclude development risk defense for pharmaceutical products
while Ministry of Health and Consumption wanted to exclude development risk de-
fense for both medicines and foods).
152. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 397 n.134, 406 n.165 (stating European Commis-
sion considered Germany's Pharmaceuticals Law in excluding defense for pharmaceuti-
cals and attributing elimination of defense for food products to be due to Toxic Oil
Syndrome). See generally, I. Vega, The Defence of the Development Risks in Spanish Law, 1997
CONSUMER L.J. 144 (discussing Spain's exclusion of development risks defense for high
risk products).
153. See Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 400 (remarking pharmaceutical products anAl
food products are excluded from development risk defense); HODGES, supra note 17, at
591 (observing draft SPLA included defense, but not for pharmaceuticals or food prod-
ucts).
154. See Spanish Product Liability Act, supra note 54, art. 6(1) (e) (outlining devel-
opment risk defense).
155. See Spanish Products Liability Act, supra note 54, art. 6(3) (stating exceptions
to development risk defense). See also Ansaldi, supra note 54, at 428-29 (noting pharma-
ceutical products and food products are excluded from development risk defense);
HODGES, supra note 17, at 591 (noting draft SPLA included defense, but not for
pharmaceuticals or food products).
156. See Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 532, [1932] All ER Rep 1 (aban-
doning rule of privity). See also Abed Awad, The Concept of Defect in American and English
Products Liability Discourse: Despite Strict Liability Linguistics, Negligence is Back With a Ven-
geance!, 10 PACE INT'L L. REv. 275, 283 (1998) (citing Donoghue, where Court overruled
Winterbottom's privity rule); Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 50 (discussing
tort of negligence and duty imposed on those engaged in commercial manufacture and
supply of goods and services).
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injuries caused by defective products. 157 Actions for negligence
were not limited to those in privity to the defendant.15 Negli-
gence-based product liability law in England developed into
strict liability through legislative action with the Sale of Goods
Act of 1979.159 Thus, starting from 1979, consumers had the op-
tion to bring an action under statutorily created warranties.160
Such actions were advantageous in that the warranties of quality
and fitness for purpose were implied terms to contracts161 and
recovery was allowed for both physical and pure economic loss
caused by breach of warranty.1 62 Contract claims however, re-
mained limited to those in privity with the seller.163
The United Kingdom implemented the Directive through
the Consumer Protection Act, which came into force on March
1, 1988.164 The inclusion of the development risk defense in the
Directive was largely the contribution of the Thatcher adminis-
tration, which agreed to sign the Directive only after the provi-
sion was included in the final version of the Directive. 16 5 With
157. See Awad, supra note 156, at 284 (stating Donoghue created negligence cause of
action for defective products); Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 50 (discuss-
ing tort of negligence and duty imposed on those engaged in commercial manufacture
and supply of goods and services).
158. See Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 50 (reporting negligence
claims were not limited by privity); HODGES, supra note 17, at 663 (asserting duty of care
extended to every person in chain of design, manufacture and supply).
159. See Awad, supra note 156, at 284-85 (noting England relied on legislative
evolution toward strict liability, enacting consumer protection laws like the Sale of
Goods Act); Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 48 (referring to Sale of Goods
Warranties as providing strict liability claims for consumers).
160. See Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 48 (pointing out obligations
imposed by Act include statutory warranty as to quality and fitness for purpose);
HODGES, supra note 17, at 660 (citing Section 14 of Sale of Goods Act).
161. See Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 49 (noting warranties were
implied in contract of sale by law); HODGES, supra note 17, at 660 (stating "merchanta-
ble quality" and "fitness for purpose" were implied terms in Sale of Goods Act).
162. See Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 49 (reporting recovery is al-
lowed for pure economic loss); KELLY & ArrREE, supra note 17, at 444 (remarking eco-
nomic loss not related to physical or property damage are recoverable).
163. See Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 49 (explaining only parties
who sold defective product can be sued and only buyers can sue); HODGES, supra note
17, at 661 (noting that seller is liable for defective product even if he has exercised all
reasonable care and may not restrict his liability against consumer).
164. See Consumer Protection Act, supra note 53 (incorporating Directive into UK
national law). See PEARL, supra note 38, at 11 (providing date of adoption of UK's na-
tional product liability law); HODGES, supra note 17, at 669 (reporting implementing act
and date on which legislation came into force).
165. See Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 56-57 (stating Thatcher ad-
ministration specifically demanded inclusion of development risk defense and agreed
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the exception of the United Kingdom, all Member States
adopted the development risk defense verbatim from the word-
ing in the Directive. 6 6 The drafters of the Consumer Protection
Act chose to deviate from the wording of the Directive when it
came to the development risk defense, wording the defense in a
manner that gave it producer-friendly construction. 167 Because
of this qualification, the European Commission brought an ac-
tion against the United Kingdom for failing to fulfill its obliga-
tion under the Directive and under the EC Treaty.
168
II. DEVELOPMENT RISK DEFENSE AND STATE-OF-THE-ART
Most commentators recognize that the Directive was in-
spired by Section 402A of the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") .169 The controver-
to sign Directive only with provision in place); Stapleton, Bugs in Products Liability, supra
note 34, at 1232 (noting that development risk defense was compromise demanded by
Thatcher administration).
166. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 563 (noting United King-
dom was only Member State not to adopt wording of Directive verbatim); Stapleton,
Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 57 (noting all other Member States implementing
development defense merely reproduced the wording of Directive). But see Hurd, supra
note 27, at 53 (stating Italy implemented development risk defense in a manner more
generous to producers than that of Directive and European Commission has brought
an action against Italy based on language of development risk defense); Patrick Thieffry
et al., Strict Product Liability in The EEC: Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manu-
facturers of Directive 85/374, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 65, 79 (1989) (noting European Com-
mission found Italy's wording of development risk defense too general and has decide
to bring proceedings against Italy). However, subsequent publications make no men-
tion of a proceeding against Italy. See Patrick E. Thieffry, EEC Directive 85/374 on Liabil-
ity for Defective Products: Implementation artd Practice 35-36 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 371, 1989) (discussing Italy's implementation of Direc-
tive); Richard H. Dreyfuss, The Italian Law on Strict Products Liability, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INr'L & COMP. L. 37, 72-73 (1997) (discussing Italy's decision to excluded liability for
development risks).
167. See Consumer Protection Act, supra note 53, at ch. 43, pt. 1, § 4(1) (e) (outlin-
ing UK's development risk defense). See also Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13,
at 57 (noting producer-friendly construction of UK's development risk defense).
168. See Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Case C-300/95, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 936; Opinion of Advo-
cate General Tesauro, Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Case C-300/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-2649, [1997] 3
C.M.L.R. 923 (summarizing European Commission's action against United Kingdom
for failure to implement Directive).
169. See Price, supra note 51, at 1338 (noting Directive mirrors Section 402A of
Restatement (Second)); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 17, at 11 (criticizing Europe for
committing itself to same position as that of Section 402A of Restatement (Second)). Sec-
tion §402A states:
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sies surrounding Section 402A, specifically in defining "design
defect," reflect the tension between strict liability and negligence
concepts.170 The EC, having based the Directive on Section
402A did not escape this debate.' Commentators argue that
absolving manufacturers of liability associated with unknowable
or unavoidable risks muddles a strict liability system with excep-
tions. t7 2 Others argue that it is inherently unfair to hold manu-
factures liable for risks over which they have no control.173 The
tension between strict liability and negligence regimes is high-
lighted by the controversy surrounding the state-of-the-art de-
fense in the United States and the development risk defense in
Europe.
174
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
170. See Carey B. Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products
Liability, 67 MINN. L. Rv. 343, 348 (1982) (commenting on tension between negligence
and strict liability theory and role of state-of-the-art); Gary C. Robb, A Practical Approach
to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability Cases, 77 NW. U. L. REv. 1, 10
(1982) (characterizing relationship between state-of-the-art evidence and strict liabil-
ity); Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability; The
Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1183, 1206 (1992) (describing role of state-of-the-
art in differentiating negligence based liability from strict product liability).
171. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 569 (discussing interpreta-
tion of development risk defense in United Kingdom under Directive); Stapleton, Myths
of Reform, supra note 13, at 67 (remarking Directive provides pockets of strict liability
but leaves design defect cases under fault-based liability); Mark Mildred & Geraint How-
ells, Comment on "Development Risks: Unanswered Questions, 61 MODERN L. REv. 570, 573
(1998) (arguing for removal of development risk defense).
172. See Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 987 (pointing out that defense runs
counter to rationale of strict liability); Mildred & Howells, supra note 171, at 573 (advo-
cating removal of development risk defense).
173. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 569 (concluding practical
interpretation of development risk defense must include concept of reasonableness).
See also Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 60 (advocating accessibility/reasona-
bleness standard for development risk defense interpretation).
174. Marshall S. Shapo, Comparing Products Liability: Concepts in European and Ameri-
can Law, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 279, 302 (1993) (commenting on state-of-the-art contro-
1970 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1940
A. Development Risk Defense and State-of-the-art
Concept Distinguished
The development risk defense provides that a producer will
not be held liable for a defective product if he proves that at the
time he put his product into circulation, the existence of the
defect was undiscoverable given the state of scientific and techni-
cal knowledge.' 75 There has been some confusion as to the
scope of development risk and whether there is any overlap with
state-of-the-art, as it is used in U.S. product liability law. 1 7 6 One
commentator used state-of-the-art and "development risks" sy-
nonymously, stating that discovery of the defect in a product
must have been absolutely impossible for the defense to apply.' 77
This conflation of state-of-the-art with "development risks," over-
simplifies the relevant concepts.1 78 State-of-the-art, as it is used
in U.S. product liability law, can mean anything from industry
custom to technological feasibility. 179 "Development risk" in the
EC has been defined more narrowly. 180 Another commentator
versy in United States and development risk controversy in Europe); See Howells & Mil-
dred, supra note 39, at 998, 1025 (comparing state-of-the-art considerations in United
States and development risk defense in Europe).
175. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 7(e) (establishing development risk defense).
176. See, e.g., Linger, supra note 14, at 488 (stating "Article 7(e) defines 'state of
the art' or development risks defense"); Taschner, supra note 36, at 31-32 (distinguish-
ing between state-of-the-art concept and development risk concept). For the purposes
of this Note, "state-of-the-art" will refer to the U.S. consideration of scientific and tech-
nology knowledge while "development risks" will refer to the defense as described in
Article 7(e) of the Directive.
177. See Linger, supra note 14, at 488 (using "state-of-the-art" and "development
risks defense" synonymously).
178. See FrankJ. Vandall, State-of-the-art, Custom, and Reasonable Alternative Design, 28
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1193, 1200-03 (1994) (noting varying definitions of state-of-the-art);
Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at 21-24 (de-
fining development risk defense as being determined by most advanced state of scien-
tific knowledge and accessibility of that knowledge).
179. See Vandall, supra note 178, at 1200-03 (discussing various usages of state-of-
the-art); Spradley, supra note 170, at 344-47 (summarizing common usages of state-of-
the-art); Robb, supra note 170, at 4-5 (noting many different definitions of state-of-the-
art).
180. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at
21-24 (holding liability depends on most advanced state of scientific knowledge and
accessibility of that knowledge). See also Pearl, supra note 38, at 20 (summarizing hold-
ing of European Court ofJustice in United Kingdom). In an article describing efforts to
harmonize product liability law in the EC, Sandra Hurd writes:
[w] hile it is true that the Directive on Product Liability does not and never will
effectuate complete harmonization, the variations among the Member States'
harmonizing legislation and existing national laws are not significant enough
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distinguished the two concepts by framing the state-of-the-art
question as whether technical standards at the time a product
was manufactured was followed, making the product non-defec-
tive even if it did cause damage, and the "development risk" de-
fense as a defense against liability because the necessary scientific
and technical knowledge did not exist at the time.' Still others
label the Article 6(1)(c) consideration of the time the product
was put into circulation18 2 and the Article 6(2) subsequent reme-
dial measures caveat'83 as state-of-the-art, while "development
risks" is treated as unknowable risks.1 8
4
B. State-of-the-art: The Path to Strict Liability and Back
1. Lessons from the Restatement (Second)
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) is the most cited
provision of the Restatement (Second).185 Following its publication
in 1964, 402A has been adopted by a majority of jurisdictions.181
to disparage the effort. They are no where near as great as the variations that
exist in United States product liability law.
Hurd, supra note 27, at 68 (pointing out that variations in Member States' product
liability laws are not as great as variations in U.S. product liability law).
181. See Taschner, supra note 36, at 31-32 (differentiating between state-of-the-art
concept and development risk concept). According to Taschner, the Directive does not
answer the state-of-the-art question and provides a defense for development risk only.
See id. at 31 (stating "[t]he Directive does not provide for a 'state-of-the-art' defense").
182. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 6(1)(c) (stating "the safety which a person is
entitled to expect taking all circumstances into account, including: (c) the time when
the product was put into circulation").
183. See Directive, supra note 24, art. 6(2) (providing "[a] product shall not be
considered defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into
circulation").
184. See Shapo, supra note 174, at 301-02 (framing Articles 6(1) (c) and 6(2) provi-
sions of Directive as state-of-the-art and describing development risks as risks unknow-
able at time of marketing). See also Thomas Lundmark, The Restatement of Torts (Third)
and the European Product Liability Directive, 5 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 239, 256 (1996)
(stating that cases presenting issues of unknowable risks outline scope of development
risk defense).
185. See John H. Chun, The New Citadel: A Reasonably Designed Product Liability Re-
statement, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1654, 1654 (1994) (noting Section 402A is most fre-
quently cited provision of Restatement (Second)); Henry J. Reske, Experts Tackle Torts Re-
statement: Product Liability Gets First Review; Design Defects and Warnings At Issue, 78 A.B.A.
J. 18, 18 (Aug. 1992) (remarking Section 402A of Restatement (Second) is cited more
frequently by courts than any other part of any ALI restatement).
186. See John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns
a "New Cloth "for Section 402A Product Liability Design Defects-A Survey of The States Reveals
a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 507 (1996) (stating almost every jurisdiction
immediately adopted Section 402A); David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703,
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The correct interpretation of 402A has been more controversial,
however, especially in the evaluating of product defects. 1 7 The
jurisprudence of 402A has identified three broad categories of
product defect: design defect, manufacturing defect, and warn-
ing defect.' 8 Courts and commentators have noted that deter-
mining the proper test for design defectiveness has dominated
product liability law over the last four decades.8 9
a. Design Defectiveness
Section 402A is silent when it comes to defining design de-
fectiveness, 9 ° but comment i suggests that 402A applies when the
product defect makes it "unreasonably" dangerous to the con-
sumer.'9 1 Relying on the reference to the consumer as the judge
of defectiveness in comment i, courts devised the "consumer ex-
pectation test" to evaluate design defectiveness. 9 2 The expecta-
tion of the ordinary consumer, a concept that focuses strictly on
the product and not on the conduct of the manufacturer is the
focus.' Over the years, courts have formulated other ap-
714 (1992) (noting "explosive spread" of strict product liability following introduction
of Section 402A of Restatement (Second)); Chun, supra note 185, at 1657 (reporting Sec-
tion 402A of Restatement (Second) is nearly universal rule).
187. See Theodore S. Jankowski, Focusing on Quality and Risk: The Central Role of
Reasonable Alternatives in Evaluating Design and Warning Decisions, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 283,
309 (1995) (observing confusion on meaning of defect following emergence of Section
402A of Restatement (Second)); Wertheimer, supra note 170, at 1191 (noting focus of
debate involving strict product liability has been on definition of defect).
188. SeeJankowski, supra note 187, at 309-10 (describing emergence of three cate-
gories of product defect); John W. Wade, On The Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 740 (1983) (stating three ways
product defect can become actionable).
189. See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1700,
1709 (2003) (noting task of determining proper test for design defectiveness has been
focus of product liability); David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict"
Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. Rv. 743, 753 (1996) (asserting most vexing prob-
lem in product liability law is determination of proper basis of liability for dangers in
design).
190. See Kysar, supra note 189, at 1711 (pointing out Section 402A does not define
defectiveness); Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict Liabil-
ity Actions for Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1189, 1993 (1994) (stating
Section 402A does not define design defect).
191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A, cmt. i (1965).
192. See Kysar, supra note 189, at 1712-13 (discussing comment i and consumer ex-
pectation test); Jankowski, supra note 187 at 314-18 (outlining consumer expectation
approach).
193. See HENDERSON & TwERsKi, supra note 7, at 492 (observing some commenta-
tors and courts denounce risk-utility test which sounds very much like negligence and
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proaches to determining the adequacy of product design, most
notably the risk-utility test.'94 The risk-utility test determines the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's design decision in balanc-
ing the potential risks involved and the cost to the manufacture
of preventing injuries,195 a concept very much rooted in negli-
gence theory. 196
b. Defining State-of-the-art
Highlighting the tension between negligence-based product
liability and strict product liability was the issue of admissibility
of state-of-the-art evidence.1 97 Cases where state-of-the-art evi-
dence becomes an issue involve mostly design defect issues since
the determination of design defectiveness is highly dependant
on scientific and technological advances. 9 ' First used in a 1956
Illinois case involving an allegedly negligently designed door,1 99
state-of-the-art was never clearly defined, leading to the present
advocate test based on consumer expectations). See also Green v. Smith & Nephew
AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 802 (2001) (holding Wisconsin strict product liability law
only applies consumer expectation test and that focus is on nature of defendant's prod-
uct rather than on defendant's conduct).
194. See Kysar, supra note 189, at 1711-12 (explaining that risk-utility analysis con-
siders potential risks of injury and costs to manufactures to prevent injuries); Jankowski,
supra note 187 at 318-24 (detailing risk-utility approach as balancing test which consid-
ers risks of injury and cost to prevent injuries).
195. SeeJohn W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. LJ.
825 (1973) (proposing seven factors to be balanced in determining design reasonable-
ness); Jankowski, supra note 187, at 295-96 (reporting risk-utility analysis compares ad-
vantages and disadvantages of potential designs).
196. See Chun, supra note 185, at 1658-59 (noting risk-utility approach derives
from negligence standard); Patrick Lavelle, Crashing Into Proof of a Reasonable Alternative
Design: The Fallacy of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 38 DuQ. L. REV.
1059, 1061 (2000) (stating reasonable alternative design requirement "injects negli-
gence principles").
197. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 348 (commenting on tension between negli-
gence and strict liability theory and role of state-of-the-art); Robb, supra note 170, at 10
(characterizing relationship between state-of-the-art evidence and strict liability); Wert-
heimer, supra note 170, at 1206 (describing role of state-of-the-art in differentiating
negligence based liability from strict product liability).
198. See Wade, supra note 188, at 740 (noting most problems involving time ele-
ment have come from design cases since scientific developments tend to impact design
defectiveness). See generally HENDERSON & TwERs~i, supra note 7, at 588 (discussing time
dimensions of product design liability).
199. See Day v. Barber-Coleman Company, 135 N.E.2d 231, 237 (1956) (remarking
that "state-of-the-art" at time door was circulated would not have required material
change in design). See also Robb, supra note 170, at 3 (crediting Day v. Barber-Colman
for coining "state-of-the-art").
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confusion over its precise meaning.2 00
At least three discrete uses of the term state-of-the-art have
appeared since its introduction in the mid-50's: z2 1 (1) as cus-
tomary industry practices; 2 °2 (2) as governmental standards; 20
and (3) as the practicality or feasibility of a design. 20 4 A fifty-
state survey of the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence is be-
yond the scope of this Note.2 0 5 The treatment of state-of-the-art
evidence by a few selected states, however, is instructive.
Very few states hold state-of-the-art to be synonymous with
industry practice, although even courts applying other standards
have treated it as one factor to state-of-the-art determinations. 20
6
200. See Robb, supra note 170, at 5 (noting confusion that exists among courts in
applying state-of-the-art concept); Vandall, supra note 178, at 1193 (remarking there is
no widely accepted definition of state-of-the-art).
201. See Vandall, supra note 178, at 1193, 1200-03 (discussing various usages of
state-of-the-art); Spradley, supra note 170, at 344-47 (summarizing common use of state-
of-the-art); Robb, supra note 170, at 4-5 (noting many different definitions of state-of-
the-art).
202. See Wertheimer, supra note 170, at 1234 (discussing Supreme Court of Texas'
holding in Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980)); Spradley,
supra note 170, at 355-63 (raising argument against admitting state-of-the-art evidence
when it is defined as industry practice); Robb, supra note 170, at 16 (noting few courts
treat state-of-the-art as industry standards).
203. See Vandall, supra note 178, at 1200-01 (discussing use of government stan-
dards as state-of-the-art); Spradley, supra note 170, at 367-74 (describing use of state-of-
the-art evidence when it is defined in terms of governmental standards). The use of
government standards as state-of-the-art evidence is more appropriately discussed under
the federal preemption doctrine and will not be explored in detail in this Note. Gener-
ally, compliance with governmental regulations is indicative of a minimum effort re-
quired to make a product safe and does not serve as a defense. See Vandall, supra note
178, at 1200-01 (discussing Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (1978));
Spradley, supra note 170, at 367 (stating governmental standards define minimum
product design quality and conditions of distribution).
204. See Vandall, supra note 178, at 1201-03 (discussing role of state-of-the-art in
proving reasonable alternative design); Robb, supra note 170, at 17-18 (pointing out use
of state-of-the-art to set up parameters of feasibility).
205. Several useful compilations have been assembled by others. See generally
Vargo, supra note 186 (providing fifty state survey on design defect cases including
treatment of state-of-the-art evidence); THE STATE OF THE ART DEFENSE IN PRODUCT LIA-
BILrTY CASES: A FIFIY-STATE SURVEY (James H. Rotondo ed., 1995) (outlining informa-
tion on possible defenses to product liability in each state); PRODUCTS LIABILITY DE-
FENSES: A STATE-BY-STATE COMPENDIUM (Davidson Ream ed., 2001) (1992) (giving infor-
mation on possible defenses to product liability in each state).
206. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 359 (noting courts have considered industry
practice probative in determining existence of design defect); James Boyd & Daniel E.
Ingeberman, Should "Relative Safety"Be a Test of Product Liability?, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 433,
439-40 (1997) (observing adherence may be used to demonstrate that product's charac-
teristics are consistent with consumer expectations).
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Alaska and Texas have taken this minority position of treating
industry practice as state-of-the-art evidence. 20 7 The Supreme
Court of Alaska discussed state-of-the-art and industry custom in
Keogh v. WR. Grasle, Inc. 2°8 as if they were the same, noting that
"state-of-the-art or industry custom evidence ' 2°9 was not disposi-
tive in determining whether there is any liability but that the jury
was allowed to consider such evidence.2 1 0 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court of Texas' opinion in Bailey v. Boatland of Houston,
Inc.2 1 1 is frequently cited on the question of whether industry
standards should be admitted as state-of-the-art evidence.21 2 Sa-
muel Bailey was thrown out of the boat he was operating and
killed by the propeller when the boat circled back towards
him.2 1 1 Samuel Bailey's family sued the boat manufacturer for
defectively designing the boat without a kill switch, which would
have automatically shut down the motor of the boat when Bailey
was thrown off.214 The defendant introduced evidence that the
use of kill switches were known, but not used in the industry.21 5
Although the majority opinion in Boatland distinguished indus-
207. See e.g., Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1991) (discussing
state-of-the-art and industry custom as if they were synonymous); Boatland of Houston,
Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) (allowing Defendant to escape liability be-
cause they followed industry custom).
208. 816 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1991) (discussing state-of-the-art and industry custom).
209. Id. at 1349 (indicating Court's synonymous treatment of the two concepts).
210. See id. The Court stated that:
Although the parties dispute whether industry custom and state of the art are
distinct concepts, we find it unnecessary to resolve this question for the pur-
poses of this appeal. We conclude that the fundamental evidentiary analysis
... should be identical regardless whether the evidence at issue here is consid-
ered industry custom or state of the art evidence.
Id. at 1349 n.10. However, in Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, the Court had stated that
"[g]enerally speaking, 'state of the art' refers to customary practice in industry." 594
P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979).
211. 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) (allowing Defendant to escape liability by show-
ing that they followed industry custom).
212. See Wertheimer, supra note 170, at 1234 (stating that state-of-the-art becomes
state of industry custom in Boatland); Vargo, supra note 186, at 908-11 (noting court
allowed evidence of industry custom to rebut plaintiffs claim of technological feasibil-
ity).
213. See Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 745 (reporting Bailey was thrown out of his boat
and killed by propeller when boat circled back towards him).
214. See id. (explaining Bailey's wife and children sued Boatland for not including
kill switch, which they claim makes boat defectively designed).
215. See id. at 747 (noting Boatland introduced evidence that kill switches were not
used in industry).
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try custom from state-of-the-art textually, 216 justice Campbell ar-
gued in a dissenting opinion that practically speaking, the major-
ity made no such distinction.2 1 7 Justice Campbell noted that the
majority's decision was based on commercial unavailability of the
kill switch, i.e., "the result of practice in the bass boat manufac-
turing industry" rather than "true limitation on feasibility to the
manufacturer."2 1 8
The most convincing argument against allowing considera-
tion of industry standards is attributed to Judge Learned Hand
in The TJ Hooper.2 19 An entire industry may be negligent in fail-
ing to implement new technology but the "[c]ourts must in the
end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative
that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omis-
sion. '"220 As suggested by one commentator, admitting industry
custom as state-of-the-art evidence would eviscerate the incentive
for manufacturers to adopt safer practices. 221
Most courts differentiate between industry custom and state-
of-the-art evidence, defining state-of-the-art as some variation of
scientific or technological feasibility. 222 Generally speaking,
state-of-the-art refers to the reasonableness of a design consider-
ing the level of scientific and technical knowledge within eco-
216. See id. at 748 (stating that custom is distinguishable from state-of-the-art).
217. See id. at 752 (emphasizing that state-of-the-art is not state of industry).
218. Id. See Wertheimer, supra note 170, at 1234 (remarking that state-of-the-art
was equated to state of industry custom rather than state of technology). But see Vargo,
supra note 186, at 910 (stating that Court distinguished custom from state-of-the-art).
219. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that following industry custom does not
exempt defendant from liability).
220. T.J Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 360-61 (quoting
T.J Hooper to argue against admitting industry custom as state-of-the-art); Boyd & In-
geberman, supra note 206, at 445 (discussing role of T.J. Hoaper in admitting evidence
of customary practice).
221. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 361 (noting that if standard of care is based
on custom, one major purpose of imposing strict liability, providing an incentive for
safer products, would be eviscerated); Lavelle, supra note 196, at 1071-72 (noting use of
industry custom as state-of-the-art has been dismissed by courts as improper).
222. See MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCT LIABILITY ch. 10, § 10:5, 631 (2003) [herein-
after MADDEN & OWEN) (defining state-of-the-art as lying somewhere between industry
custom and best science and technology in existence). For example, a Nebraska statute
§ 25-21,182 defines state-of-the-art as "the best technology reasonably available at the
time" (Neb. Rev. St. § 25-21,182) while Arizona defines the term as "the technical,
mechanical and scientific knowledge of manufacturing, designing, testing or labeling
the same or similar products which was in existence and reasonably feasible for use at
the time of manufacture" (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-681(8)).
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nomically practical bounds.2 25 While some jurisdictions allow
defendants to submit state-of-the-art evidence as an affirmative
defense to liability,2 24 other jurisdictions grant a rebuttable pre-
sumption in favor of non-defectiveness.2 25 The majority position
is that state-of-the-art evidence is relevant to issues of product
defectiveness, especially towards the determination of a reasona-
ble alternative design.2 26
c. Unknown or Unavoidable
In predicting the death of strict product liability in the
United States, Professor Ellen Wertheimer lamented that by
abolishing strict liability, courts have forgotten they are forcing
an innocent plaintiff to bear the cost of the damage caused by
the defective product, rather than the manufacturer who prof-
ited and was responsible for placing the defective product on the
market in the first place.227 The battle between strict liability
and negligence regimes reflects a debate over the apportion-
ment of risk.22' Fact patterns which deal with unknown or una-
223. See PRODUcrs LIABLI-rv PRACTICE GUIDE pt. I, ch. 15, § 15.08 (2003) (re-
marking state-of-the-art concept encompasses practical considerations as well as techni-
cal possibility); HENDERSON & TwEmsKi, supra note 7, at 594 (noting state-of-the-art con-
cept evaluates safety features available at time of distribution taking into consideration
cost effectiveness).
224. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 668.12 (1987); 2A N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58C-3(a)(1); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 5 0 7 :8-g. See generally MADDEN & OWEN § 10:5, supra note 222, at n.44
(providing examples of states that allow state-of-the-art evidence in as complete defense
to liability).
225. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat § 13-21-403(1) (a); Ind. Code § 34-20-5-1; Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 411.310(2). See generally MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 222, at § 10:5 n.48-50 (dis-
cussing state statutes that create rebuttable presumptions). But note that the Illinois
statute which created a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness (735 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann 5/2-2104) was held unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in Best v.
Talyor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (holding that cap on compensatory
damages for noneconomic injuries and provision deeming personal injury plaintiff to
have consented to unlimited disclosure of all medical records were unconstitutional
and invalid provisions were not severable from the remainder of the Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1995).
226. See Wertheimer, supra note 170, at 1200 (noting state-of-the-art defense "en-
tered through the balancing door" with requirement to show alternative feasible de-
sign); Spradley, supra note 170, at 416-33 (discussing feasibility of design changes).
227. See Wertheimer, supra note 170, at 1271 (commenting on unfairness of strict
liability to plaintiff).
228. See Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 998 (noting general philosophy of
risk-spreading is underpinning of strict liability). See generally Calabresi & Hirschoff,
supra note 15, at 1055 (discussing rationale of strict liability in torts).
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voidable risks229 are doctrinally critical to this debate because lia-
bility for such risks goes directly to the question of who should
bear the loss associated with risks that do not implicate fault.23
°
It follows that the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence plays
an important role in the strict liability/negligence debate since it
reflects the limits of scientific or technological knowledge, 3 1
and is therefore directly relevant to whether a risk was unknown
or unavoidable.2 3 2
The discussion of unavoidable risks implicates comment k of
Section 402A,233 which has been referred to by some as the un-
avoidably unsafe product liability defense. 23 4 Comment k has ef-
fectively placed liability for unavoidable risks into the negligence
regime by allowing defendants to escape liability as long as they
warn of foreseeable dangers. 235  The majority of jurisdictions
have decided to follow comment k for unavoidably unsafe prod-
229. As defined in this Note, unknowable risks involve risks that are either unfore-
seeable or undiscoverable prior to the design of the product while unavoidable risks are
those that were known, but could not be prevented.
230. SeeJane Stapleton, International Torts: A Comparative Study: Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 363, 368
(2000) [hereinafter Stapleton, International Torts] (remarking on importance of fact
situations related to undiscoverable product flaws for determining whether legal rule is
one of strict liability); Owen, supra note 186, at 718 (criticizing strict liability for being
unable to distinguish between reasonable conduct of manufacturers, whose product
defect is undiscoverable prior to market, and bad conduct, for which manufacturer
should be held liable).
231. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 379 (discussing limitations on scientific and
technological knowledge); Andrew T. Berry, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.:
Revolution-or Aberration-in Products Liability Law, 52 FoRDHAM L. REv. 786, 803 (1984)
(noting scientific limitations in manufacturing defect cases and inadequacy of scientific
knowledge for design defect cases).
232. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 379-411 (explaining unavoidable risks as un-
discoverable risks and technological impossibility); Wertheimer, supra note 170, at
1210-12 (discussing unavoidable risks as absence of knowledge of cure and unknowable
risks as absence of knowledge of product's danger).
233. RESTATEMENT (SECoNn) §402A, cmt. k (1965). Comment k states that "a prod-
uct, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not de-
fective." Id.
234. See Boyd & Ingeberman, supra note 206, at 438 (referring to comment k as
unavoidably unsafe product defense); Kysar, supra note 189, at 1721 n.92 (alluding to
unavoidable unsafe product defense of comment k).
235. See Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories), 751 P.2d 470, 477 (1988)
(holding appropriate test for determining responsibility for defectively designed drug is
comment k and not strict liability); George H. King, A Prescription for Applying Strict Liabil-
ity: Not All Drugs Deserve Comment K Immunization, Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049,
751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1988), 21 ARiz. ST. L.J. 809, 812 (1989) (noting ALI's
refusal to apply strict liability to unavoidably unsafe products).
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ucts. 2 3 6 The question that remained was whether liability should
be imposed for products found to be defective because of un-
knowable risks.237
d. Policy Considerations Related to State-of-the-art
Advocates of a strict liability system believe that strict liability
ought to be genuinely strict rather than a higher form of negli-
gence. 23" They emphasize that the basic premise of imposition
of liability without fault is to relieve plaintiffs of the burden of
proving negligence. 239  As Justice Traynor argued in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,24° the manufacturer is in the bet-
ter position to identify the cause of the defect. 241  One common
argument against admitting state-of-the-art evidence is that such
evidence goes to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's con-
duct; a consideration irrelevant to a strict liability system. 242
From a policy perspective, commentators have argued that strict
liability will minimize future accidents and distribute the cost of
compensating plaintiffs throughout society. 2 " Accident minimi-
zation is achieved through deterrence, by motivating manufac-
236. See Walker, supra note 2, at 780 (citing comment k of Section 402A of Restate-
ment (Second) for proposition that manufacturers are not liable for unavoidably safe
products); HENDERSON & TwERSKI, supra note 7, at 456 (explaining comment k has been
adopted in overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions and imposes liability on drug manu-
facturers only if it fails to warn of defect).
237. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 654-55 (discussing case law dealing with un-
knowable risks); Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Lia-
bility: What Liability Rule Should be Applied to the Seller of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 Ky.
L.J. 705, 740-41 (1990) (remarking comment k does not cover scientifically unknowable
risks).
238. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 420 (characterizing position of some courts as
desiring genuinely strict liability system); Price, supra note 51, at 1279 (declaring that
strict liability has been distorted beyond recognition by negligence concepts).
239. See Vargo, supra note 186, at 508 (asserting basic policy foundation for strict
liability is to relieve consumer from burden of proving negligence); Ausness, supra note
237, at 742-44 (explaining burden of proof rationale for strict liability).
240. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
241. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 463 (Cal. 1944)
(observing manufacturer is familiar with manufacturing process and is in better posi-
tion than plaintiff to identify cause of defect); Vargo, supra note 186, at 508 (noting
complexities of product make it difficult for plaintiff to establish defect compared to
manufacturer who has access to expertise and information).
242. See id. at 389-90 (noting lack of fault is irrelevant since manufacturer's lack of
knowledge of defect does not change fact that product was defective); Robb, supra note
170, at 14 (stating liability is imposed irrespective of reasonableness of manufacturer's
conduct and solely on basis of defective product).
243. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 408 (discussing loss spreading and accident
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turers to proceed with more care in identifying and correcting
preventable risks and incentivizing them by encouraging re-
search and development of newer and safer products.2 4 4 Loss
spreading is achieved through insurance from a pool supported
by the premiums of other manufacturers or passed on to con-
sumers by raising the price of the product.245
Very few courts have been adamant about not allowing state-
of-the-art evidence.246 Wisconsin stands lonely, if not alone, in
its refusal to consider state-of-the-art.247 The admissibility of
state-of-the-art evidence in Wisconsin was decided in Green v.
Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc. 2 4 8 Linda Green, a hospital worker
who developed latex allergy from the gloves she was required to
wear, sued Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc. ("S & N"), the manufac-
turer of the latex gloves.2 49 Green argued that the gloves were
defectively designed because they contained excessive levels of
allergy-causing latex proteins. 250  Green also asserted that the
cornstarch used to powder the gloves increased the possibility
minimization as rationales for imposing strict liability); Wertheimer, supra note 170, at
1185-91 (describing economic reasons for imposing strict liability).
244. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 409 (explaining accident minimization ratio-
nale); Boyd & Ingeberman, supra note 206, at 470-71 (arguing if state-of-the-art is cus-
tomary practice, manufacturers are unlikely to improve safety whereas if state-of-the-art
is technological advancement, an incentive is provided for manufacturers to spend
more on safety).
245. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 408 (discussing loss spreading rationale);
Wertheimer, supra note 170, at 1187-89 (discussing cost spreading rationale).
246. See generally Vargo, supra note 186 (providing fifty state survey on design de-
fect cases including treatment of state-of-the-art evidence); THE STATE OF THE ART DE-
FENSE, supra note 205 (outlining information on possible defenses to product liability in
each state); PRODucTs LIA1iLrTy DEFENSES, supra note 205 (giving information on possi-
ble defenses to product liability in each state).
247. See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.V.2d 727, 735-36 (Wis. 2001)
(holding manufacturer responsible for injuries caused by products regardless of
whether he had or could have had knowledge of potential danger).
248. 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001) (declining to admit state-of-the-art evidence,
holding it irrelevant in consumer expectation test).
249. See id. at 732 (reporting Green developed allergies to latex from gloves she
was required to wear as hospital worker). See also Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M.
Tedesco, The Re-emergence of "Super Strict" Liability: Slaying the Dragon Again, 71 U. CIN. L.
Rv. 917, 918-19 (2003) (commenting on health care worker's product liability suit
against manufacturer of latex gloves).
250. See Green, 629 N.W.2d at 732 (arguing design defect because of excessive
levels of latex protein). See also Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 249, at 919 (observing
Green's lawyer argued that Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc. ("S & N") should have reduced
level of latex protein).
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that she would inhale the latex proteins. 25 1 At the time Green
started experiencing allergic reactions to the latex, the health
care community was generally unaware that individuals could de-
velop allergic reactions to latex proteins. 52 The jury neverthe-
less returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff after receiving in-
structions to use the consumer expectation test to determine de-
sign defectiveness. 25 ' As part of the jury instruction, Milwaukee
County Circuit Court reiterated that a manufacturer will be held
liable for a defective and unreasonably dangerous product, re-
gardless of whether the manufacturer had knowledge or could
have known of the risk of harm. 254 The defendant, S & N ap-
pealed, arguing that imposing liability for unknown defects
transformed strict liability to absolute liability. 255 To avoid abso-
lute liability, an element of foreseeability must be included in
product liability law. 256 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin af-
firmed both the Milwaukee County Circuit Court and the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals' decision to enter judgment on the
jury's verdict, stating that foreseeability is an element of negli-
gence, not strict liability, which only looks at the nature of the
defendant's product.257
Some courts import a notion of reasonableness into strict
liability fearing that the pure form of strict liability, considering
251. See Green, 629 N.W.2d at 732 (asserting defectiveness in design due to use of
corn starch in powder gloves, increasing likelihood of latex protein inhalation). See also
Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 249, at 919 (remarking Green's lawyer assert that gloves
should not be made with cornstarch).
252. See Green, 629 N.W.2d at 733 (pointing out health care community did not
know allergic reactions to latex would develop). See also Schwartz & Tedesco, supra
note 249, at 919 (explaining that health care community was unaware that individuals
could develop allergies from latex).
253. See Green, 629 N.W.2d at 736 (finding S & N's gloves defective and unreasona-
bly dangerous after considering instructions to use consumer expectation test). See also
Schwartz & Tedesco, supra, note 249, at 918 (describing Wisconsin's stubbornness in
sticking to consumer expectation test in context of Green case).
254. See Green, 629 N.W.2d at 735-36 (declaring manufacturer liable for defective
product even if manufacturer had no knowledge or could not have known of risk of
harm of defect).
255. See id. at 744 (arguing that holding manufacturers responsible for defects that
they do not and cannot know of transforms strict liability into absolute liability).
256. See id. (contending that element of foreseeability must be included in product
liability law to avoid turning strict liability into absolute liability).
257. See Green, 629 N.W.2d at 745 (contrasting negligence, of which foreseeability
is element, and strict product liability, which focuses on defendant's product rather
than on defendant's conduct).
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social, economic, and political implications, is too harsh.258 In
line with arguments made by S & N in the Wisconsin latex al-
lergy case, advocates of reasonableness considerations in prod-
uct liability argue that imposing liability for unknowable risks
amounts to absolute liability, making the manufacturer the in-
surer of his products. 2 '9 In order to prevent strict liability from
becoming absolute liability, a minimal element of fault must re-
main in the interpretation of Section 402A's meaning of "defec-
tive condition. ' 260 Proponents of strict liability argue that strict
liability is not absolute liability.26 1 Plaintiffs still have to prove
the basic elements of a product liability case - causation, defect
and injury. 26 2 Courts that have allowed state-of-the-art evidence
find such evidence relevant to the issue of design defective-
ness.
263
The rationale behind imposing no-fault strict liability has
been challenged as well.2 64 Opponents of strict liability argue
that for unknowable risks, the burden of proof rationale is not as
258. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 420 (noting some courts fear that pure strict
liability is too harsh and therefore import a notion of reasonableness into strict liabil-
ity).
. 259. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 393 (emphasizing that imposition of liability
for unknowable risks amounts to absolute liability, forcing manufacturer to be insurer);
Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 249, at 922 (stating dissent in Green decision recognized
that Wisconsin was imposing absolute liability by sticking to consumer expectation test).
260. See Robb, supra note 170, at 20 (noting minimal element of fault must remain
within Section 402A in order for strict product liability not to become absolute liabil-
ity); Peter M. Kinkaid & WilliamJ. Stuntz, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability, 69 VA. L.
REV. 1111, 1119 (1983) (stating Section 402A requirement that defect exists is essen-
tially fault standard applied to seller's product and does not require absolute liability);
William L. Prosser, Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791,
812 (1966) (concluding strict liability does not apply when product is reasonable safe
except for inherent dangers that are unknowable).
261. See Price, supra note 51, at 1279 (stating strict liability, which she refers to as
causative liability, is not synonymous with absolute liability); Wertheimer, supra note
170, at 1189 (pointing out that strict liability was never intended to be absolute liabil-
ity).
262. See Price, supra note 51, at 1279 (stressing plaintiff still have to prove cause-in-
fact and proximate cause); Wertheimer, supra note 170, at 1189 (commenting require-
ment that plaintiff prove defect is significant barrier between strict liability and absolute
liability).
263. See MADDEN & OWEN § 10:5, supra note 222, at 631-32 (discussing use of state-
of-the-art evidence to demonstrate technological or scientific feasibility); Vargo, supra
note 186 (providing fifty state survey on design defect cases including treatment of
state-of-the-art evidence).
264. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 394-98 (challenging policies supporting appli-
cation of strict liability); Robb, supra note 170, at 30-33 (arguing that strict product
liability has become absolute liability).
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persuasive since manufacturers do not have control over product
risks. 265 Similarly, the loss-spreading rationale does not seem to
apply to unknowable risks, which are speculative at best.26 6 Man-
ufacturers cannot estimate the amount of loss or how often it
may occur in order to spread the CoSt. 26 7 Specifically, innovators
would have a hard time finding adequate insurance coverage at
reasonable costs since insurers of manufacturers are forced to
charge high premiums in order to preserve a comfortable safety
margin to cover unknown risks.2 6 8 In terms of accident minimi-
zation, commentators have argued that imposition of liability for
unknown risks will not deter, since it is not possible to design
around unknown risks. 269 Furthermore, even large manufactur-
ers have limited resources. 270 It is therefore unrealistic to expect
manufacturers to concentrate on one or even a few problems,
especially when such a manufacturer is likely to expect hundreds
of lawsuits every year based on any design theory it may mar-
265. See Ausness, supra note 237, at 744 (arguing that burden of proof rationale
does not support imposition of strict liability because manufacturers lack control over
scientifically unknowable risks of products). See also Christoph Ann, Innovators in the
Crossfire: A Policy Sketch for Unknowable Risks in European and United States Product Liability
Law, 10 TUL. EURO. Civ. L.F. 173, 182 (1995) (pointing out distortions in risk assess-
ment for innovator liability due to lack of information).
266. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 394 (commenting on speculative nature of
unknowable risks); Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 249, at 933 (noting that manufac-
turers' attempt at safety improvement would be guess-work if they are attempting to
avoid unknowable risks since manufacturers do not know what they are trying to avoid);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2, cmt. a (1998) (asserting imposition of liability for unforesee-
able risks might provide incentive for manufacturer to invest in safety, but such invest-
ment would be based on guesswork).
267. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 394 (noting manufacturers cannot estimate
amount or frequency of loss and therefore cannot spread loss from unknown risk);
Victor E. Schwartz, The Death of "Super Strict Liability" Common Sense Returns to Tort Law,
27 GONZ. L. REv. 179, 188 (1991) (noting California Supreme Court's concern that
imposition of liability for unknowable risks creates problems with insurability).
268. See Ann, supra note 265, at 182 (remarking on inability of innovators to find
reasonably priced insurance coverage because of high premiums charged by insurers to
shield itself form incalculable risks); Schwartz, supra note 267, at 188 (describing Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's argument that imposing liability for unknowable risks would
create insurability problems for manufacturers).
269. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 409 (declaring technologically impossible de-
sign changes cannot be made); Schwartz, supra note 267, at 183 (arguing that demand-
ing manufactures to make products safer than scientifically or technically possible is
unsound public policy).
270. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 410 (noting limited resources of manufactur-
ers); Edward T. O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art: Terminology, Practice
and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REv. 627, 645-46 (1978) (remarking on difficulty of manufac-
turer to focus resources on one problem).
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ket.2 71 In fact, such liability will discourage manufacturers from
marketing new products with unknown risks thereby reducing
consumer choice by making lower priced product unavailable.272
2. Direction of the Restatement (Third)
In March 1992, the American Law Institute announced its
intentions to revise Section 402A.2 73 Of particular interest was
the future development of strict product liability in design defect
cases. 2 7 4 More than five years later, on May 20, 1997, the final
draft of the Restatement (Third) was adopted.275 Significantly, the
Restatement (Third) adopted the risk-utility analysis for design de-
fectiveness 276 and relegated the consumer expectation test to res
ipsa-type defect cases.277 Section 2(b) of Restatement (Third) de-
fines design defectiveness in terms of the foreseeable risks of
harm and a reasonable alternative design,278 essentially adopting
271. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 410 (stating even large manufacturers cannot
focus its resources on one or, on few problems, since they are likely to expect hundreds
of lawsuits each year); O'Donnell, supra note 270, at 645-46 (noting large manufactur-
ers expect dozens or hundreds of lawsuit each year based on variety of theories, making
it difficult to concentrate resources on any single problem, or even few).
272. See Spradley, supra note 170, at 396 (arguing that liability for unknown risks
discourage marketing of new products); Robb supra note 170, at 32 (noting manufac-
turers are less likely to market products that are not as safe but are less expensive).
273. See Vargo, supra note 186, at 514 (explaining ALl announced plans to revise
Section 402A); Aaron Twerski, From a Reporter's Perspective: A Proposed Agenda, 10 TouRO
L. REv. 5, 5 n.2 (1993) (stating ALI announced plans to revise Section 402A on March
18, 1992).
274. See Lavelle, supra note 196, at 1060 (noting applicability of strict liability in
design defect cases was principle point of contention); James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, Symposium on the American Law Institute: Process, Partisanship, and the
Restatements of Law: The Politics of the Products Liability Restatement, 26 HoFsTRA L. REv.
667, 694-95 (1998) (outlining debate over issue of defective design).
275. See Lavelle, supra note 196, at 1059 (providing date Restatement (Third) was
adopted); Kysar, supra note 189, at 1702 (reporting date Restatement (Third) was
adopted).
276. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 274, at 672-74 (stating that after review
of case law and commentary, majority approach and only sensible method for deter-
mining design defective is risk-utility approach). See also Owen, supra note 189, at 758
(noting that risk-utility balancing test is adopted).
277. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 274, at 678 (asserting consumer expec-
tation test is recognized for res-ipsa type cases only). See alsoJames A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proxi-
mate Causation, 88 GEO. L.J. 659, 671-72 (2000) (describing res ipsa products cases where
consumer expectations may still be used).
278. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §2(b) (defining design defectiveness). Section
2(b) states:
A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
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a defacto state-of-the-art limitation on design obligations. 279 The
United States' trend towards the Restatement (Third)2 °  has
prompted at least one commentator to state that U.S. product
liability law has returned to its negligence roots.
28 1
C. Interpretation of the Development Risk Defense Causes
Unrest in the EC
Of all the provisions in the Directive, the development risk
defense has arguably created the most controversy.282 It is one
of two provisions from which Member States may derogate.283 As
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasona-
ble alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe.
Id. See also Owen, supra note 189, at 755 (discussing definition provided in Section
2(b)).
279. See MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 222, at § 10:8, 669 (stating Restatement
(Third) incorporates concept of state-of-the-art as part of its precept of reasonableness);
Vandall, supra note 178, at 1203 (commenting Restatement (Third) will expand use of
state-of-the-art defense); Owen, supra note 189, at 783 (noting Restatement (Third) takes
position that state-of-the-art is consistent with developing law).
280. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 277, at 672-74 (asserting examination of
case law and academic literature demonstrated strong majority ofjurisdictions use risk-
utility standard for determining design defectiveness). The Restatement (Third) report-
ers state that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have adopted the risk-utility
test and that the Restatement (Third) merely represents the majority rule. Id. However,
others have criticized the reporters for drafting the new restatement according to their
own views. See Lavelle, supra note 196, at 1101 (criticizing Reporters of Restatement
(Third) for making Restatement (Third) brief in support of their personal views); Vargo,
supra note 186, at 558 (commenting on fallacies of method by which Reporters deter-
mined that majority of states have gone to risk-utility test).
281. See Awad, supra note 156, at 276 (observing retreat of U.S. product liability
law back to negligence); Owen, supra note 186, at 723 (praising return of fault to its
natural position at heart of tort law).
282. See HOWELLS, supra note 17, at 39-40 (remarking that inclusion of develop-
ment risk defense has caused most controversy); Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra
note 49, at 560 (pointing out development risks defense has aroused most interest);
Linger, supra note 14, at 490 (noting controversial nature of development risk defense).
283. See Linger, supra note 14, at 485 (noting three optional provisions set forth by
Directive); Hans Claudius Taschner, A Different Path: Consumer Expectation Applied in the
European Community Compared with the ALI Restatement Of Third, Torts: Products Liability,
221, 222-23 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 22, 1999) (noting Article 15 of Directive
grants three options for derogation). Originally, there were three provisions that were
optional: the development risks defense, the setting of financial limits, and the cover-
age of primary agricultural product. Id. The Council Directive 1999/34 of 10 May 1999
eliminated coverage of primary agricultural product as an option. See Stapleton, Bugs in
Products Liability, supra note 34, at 1237 (observing removal of possibility that Member
State could bar claims concerning unprocessed primary products); Directive on Liability
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mentioned previously, UK implementation of the development
risk defense became the focus of debate for commentators.284
The recent study performed by Lovell suggests that producers of
innovative products are starting to push for the U.S. approach
for development risks reflected in the Restatement (Third) - a
negligence based standard."' Given its narrow interpretation in
national courts however, many practitioners and academics to
view the development risk defense as having little practical value
to producers.286
1. Can Development Risk Really Exist in a Strict Product
Liability Regime?
Professors Henderson and Twerski argue that the develop-
ment risk defense cannot exist within a strict liability system.287
They particularly criticized Europe for following outdated
402A.288 While the EC crafted its Directive in a manner reflect-
ing lessons learned from three decades of product liability law in
the United States,2 8 9 it followed outdated 1960s U.S. rhetoric of
strict liability.29 ° As an example of the backwardness of the EC
Directive, Professors Henderson & Twerski cite the language of
for Defective Products, supra note 34 (stating that Directive 1999/34/EC eliminated possi-
bility of derogation for primary agricultural products in aftermath of mad cow crisis).
284. See also, Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 563-69 (analyzing
Commission v. United Kingdom); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1000-10 (detailing
Commission v. United Kingdom); Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 58-60 (com-
menting on Commission v. United Kingdom).
285. See Lovell's Study, supra note 66, at 52 (noting arguments by producers that
strict liability standard is inappropriate for design defects); European Product Liability
Review, LOVELLS NEWSLET-rER, Sept. 2003, at 8, available at http://www.lovells.com/con-
trol/PublicationControl/pubId/412/pubType/Newsletter (summarizing concerns of
commentators that U.S. and European product liability law is drifting apart).
286. See Lovell's Study, supra note 66, at 50 (observing that many lawyers and aca-
demics view development risk defense as having little practical value to producers be-
cause of its narrow reading); Meltzer, supra note 66, at 48 (reporting that narrow read-
ing of development risk defense has caused many lawyers and academics to view devel-
opment risk defense as having little practical value).
287. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 17, at 13-14 (criticizing development
risk defense as following outdated Restatement (Second)).
288. See id. at 12-13 (predicting Europe will run into many of same conceptual
problems that had plagued U.S. product liability law from 1965 into 1990).
289. See id. at 13 (asserting that definition of "producer," admissibility of post-sale
modifications, and liability of manufacturers of component part reflect developments
in U.S. law).
290. See id. (noting Europe is moving to strict liability, following "1960s American
rhetoric" while the United States is moving in the opposite direction).
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the development risk defense, which they argue is focused on
manufacturing defects. 291 They assert that although risks may be
discovered, design defects require a value judgment, a risk-utility
judgment.29 2 Thus, the reference to "discovering the defect"293
in the development risk defense suggests focus on Section 402A
rather than the U.S. efforts to correct 402A's deficiencies in deal-
ing with design defects.2 9 4
2. Return to Negligence or Adherence to Strict Liability?
The United Kingdom's implementation of the development
risk defense in Section 4(1) (e) of the Consumer Protection Act
of 1987 opened a debate on the development risk defense. 29 5 As
mentioned above, although the United Kingdom implemented
the Directive through the Act, its wording deviated from the
original text of the Directive.2 9 6 Christopher Newdick consid-
ered that the United Kingdom government was correct in advo-
cating a reasonableness standard for the discovery of product de-
fects with regards to development risks, instead of limiting the
defense to producers who show that the defect was previously
identified. 9 7
Advocating a broader interpretation of the development
291. See id. (stating "[c]learly, the drafters of the [Article 7(e)] language focused
on manufacturing defects, whose existence can be discovered empirically in the same
manner that one can discover that a cup of tea is near boiling temperature").
292. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 17, at 13 (arguing that defects are not
"discovered," rather designs are evaluated to determine whether they are defective).
293. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 7(e) (setting out development risk defense).
Article 7(e) reads "that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when
he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect
to be discovered." Id. (emphasis added).
294. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 17, at 13-14 (chastising Europe for stick-
ing with 402A rather than following U.S. trend toward risk-utility analysis).
295. See Christopher Newdick, The Development Risk Defense of the Consumer Protection
Act 1987, 47 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 455 (1988). See alsoJane Stapleton, Products Liability Reform
- Real or Illusory?, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 392, 417-19 (1986) (addressing issues with
interpretation of development risk defense but in context of Directive rather than UK
implementation of defense).
296. See Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 57 (noting deviation in word-
ing of Section 4(1) (e) of Consumer Protection Act from Article 7(e) of Directive). See
also PEAPL, supra note 38, at 19 (comparing development risk defense as it is set out by
Consumer Protection Act with Article 7(e) of Directive).
297. See Consumer Protection Act, supra note 53, § 4(1)(e). Section 4(1)(e)
states:
[I]t shall be a defence for him to show that the state of scientific and technical
knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a producer of products of the
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risk defense, Newdick reasoned that it would be impossible for a
defendant to prove "conclusively and absolutely" that there was
no knowledge of the defect worldwide.2 98 Instead, courts would
rely on defendant's experts, in essence creating a strong pre-
sumption in favor of the defense. 299 Newdick also outlined a hy-
pothetical situation where a plaintiff suing pharmaceutical Com-
pany X finds a confidential, internal memorandum from Com-
pany Y, disclosing the existence of the defect in the drug
product of Company X.3"' Company Y is in an unrelated indus-
try which by happenstance was using the same compound as
Company X. °1 Newdick argued that a narrow interpretation of
the defense, allowing such evidence, would impose liability on
defendants in an arbitrary manner because liability would be
based on the plaintiffs luck in turning up such information.112
Newdick goes on to define the scope of the development
risk defense by outlining the boundaries of scientific and techni-
cal knowledge.3"' He first differentiated between the lack of
same description as the product in question might be expected to have discovered the
defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his control.
Id. (emphasis added). According to Newdick, the UK government asserted that the
phrase "a producer of products of the same description as the product in question
might be expected to have discovered" in Section 4(1) (e) limits the defense to what the
producers could have reasonably discovered. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 459 (dis-
cussing UK government's interpretation of development risk defense); Implementation of
E. C. Directive on Product Liability - An Explanatory and Consultative Document 5 (Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry) (1985) (suggesting reasonableness standard).
298. See id. (asserting impossibility of proving conclusively and absolutely that
there is worldwide absence of knowledge of defect); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39,
at 1011 (noting Newdick suggests impracticality of proving worldwide absence of knowl-
edge of defect).
299. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 460 (stating reliance on experts would in es-
sence create a strong presumption in favor of defense); Howells & Mildred, supra note
39, at 1011 (noting reliance on expert reliance according to Newdick).
300. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 460 (putting forth hypothetical situation
where knowledge of defect of certain material exists in unrelated industry); Howells &
Mildred, supra note 39, at 1011 (characterizing Newdick's example of unpublished evi-
dence of existence of defect as combination of events requiring leap of imagination).
301. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 460 (emphasizing knowledge evidence of de-
fect was found in unrelated industry); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1011 (not-
ing unrelated industry had knowledge of defect).
302. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 460 (considering unfairness in allowing "unre-
lated" knowledge to deny development risk defense); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39,
at 1011 (outlining Newdick's argument that allowing in evidence from unrelated indus-
try would be unfair to reasonable producer).
303. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 461-67 (discussing scope of scientific and tech-
nical knowledge); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1012 (critiquing Newdick's pro-
posed scope of scieptific and technical knowledge).
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"general" knowledge of unforeseen dangers, which he advanced
should not be excused as development risk, and a genuine lack
of scientific and technical knowledge." °4 Newdick used refriger-
ator design as an example of general knowledge. °5 Assuming
that it was unforeseeable that children playing inside the refrig-
erator would die from being locked inside, Newdick argued that
the development risk defense would not be applicable to avoid
liability for failing to install refrigerator door locks with magnetic
catches.30 6 He then stated that for scientific and technical
knowledge, both (1) the quality and reliability of the informa-
tion available and (2) the gravity of the danger anticipated from
the defect if it were to materialize must be considered in defin-
ing the earliest possible point at which knowledge may be im-
puted to a producer.3 0 7 Thus, knowledge is defined by "the reli-
able advice of experts," and speculation about a product defect
should not trigger producer liability, but something less than sci-
entific certainty should be acceptable.3 0 8 The second considera-
tion took into account the limited resources of the producer and
weighed the risk and gravity of injury in determining the obliga-
tions of the producer °.3 9 The two considerations together sug-
gest that knowledge arises when it becomes reasonable for the
producer, from the information accumulated, to take action to
protect the consumer. 10
304. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 462 (differentiating between general knowl-
edge and scientific and technical knowledge); A. DIAMOND, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY 42 (C. J. Miller ed., 1986) (discussing example of refrigerators).
305. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 462 (explaining difference between general
knowledge and scientific knowledge using refrigerator example).
306. See id. (arguing that development risk defense would not be applicable to
liability arising from lack of general knowledge).
307. See id. at 465 (discussing earliest possible moment knowledge may be imputed
to producer); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1012 (describing Newdick's consid-
eration of piecemeal evolution of scientific or technical knowledge).
308. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 455 (explaining quality and reliability of infor-
mation); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1012 (considering Newdick's first consid-
eration of quality and reliability of information).
309. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 466 (discussing gravity of danger anticipated
from defect if it were to materialize); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1012 (ad-
dressing Newdick's second consideration of gravity of danger).
310. See Newdick, supra note 295, at 466 (remarking on moment producer is
deemed to have knowledge); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1012 (explaining
earliest possible moment knowledge may be imputed to producer according to
Newdick).
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3. Action against the United Kingdom for Failure to
Implement the Directive Properly
Almost a decade after Newdick's article, the European Com-
mission brought action against the United Kingdom for failure
to implement the Directive. 31' The European Commission had
corresponded with the United Kingdom for six years to no avail
and finally brought action for infringements under Article
169312 of the EC Treaty.313  Under Article 169, the European
Commission had the burden of proving infringement.3 14
The European Commission submitted that the develop-
ment risk defense provided for in Section 4(1) (e) of the Act 31 5
imposed a lighter burden of proof than that imposed by the Di-
311rective. 6 Specifically, the Directive allowed the defense only if
it was impossible to discover the defect given the state of scien-
311. See Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Case C-300/95, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 936; Opinion of Advo-
cate General Tesauro, Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Case C-300/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-2649, [1997] 3
C.M.L.R. 923.
312. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
art. 226, O.J. C 325/33, at 125 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, at 125 (ex Article 169), incorporating
changes made by Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. C
80/1 (2001) (amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the
EC ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the ECSC, and Treaty establishing the Euratom
and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty). An infringement action under Arti-
cle 226 (ex Article 169) against a Member State is for failing to fulfill its obligation
under the Directive and under the EC Treaty by failing to take all of the measures
necessary to implement a directive. See PEARL, supra note 38, at 19 (noting European
Commission' burden under Article 226 (ex Article 169); HANLON, supra note 10, at 131
(stating in Article 226 (ex Article 226) actions, European Commission bears burden of
proof).
313. See PEARL, supra note 38, at 19 (noting six years of correspondence between
European Commission and United Kingdom before proceeding); Howells & Mildred,
supra note 39, at 1000 (reporting six years of unproductive negotiation between Euro-
pean Commission and United Kingdom before proceeding).
314. See PEARL, supra note 38, at 19 (noting infringement proceedings are brought
under Article 226 (ex-Article 169); VINCENZI & FAiRHURST, supra note 10, at 151
(describing types of infringement that may be brought under Article 226 (ex-Article
169)).
315. Consumer Protection Act, supra note 53, § 4(1) (e).
316. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at 7,
[1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 927, at 7 (considering European Commission's argument that CPA
imposes burden of proof that is lighter than that imposed by Directive). See also PEARL,
supra note 38, at 19-23 (outlining European Commission's argument that development
risk defense under Section 4(1) (e) of Consumer Protection Act was easier to demon-
strate than that of Article 7(e) of Directive).
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tific and technical knowledge, whereas Section 4(1) (e) of the
Act allowed for the defense as long as the producer is able to
show that he complied with the standard precautions of the in-
dustry and was not negligent. 17 Thus, the European Commis-
sion argued that the United Kingdom implemented a subjective
test, whereas the Directive required an objective one."'
The United Kingdom argued that the European Commis-
sion had misinterpreted the relevant portions of the Directive
and the Act, and that Section 4(1) (e) is not substantively differ-
ent from Article 7(e) of the Directive.3"9 The United Kingdom
asserted that the only way to make the defense applicable was to
interpret it as what the producer should have or could have
known given scientific and technical knowledge available.32 °
The United Kingdom argued that such an interpretation is sup-
ported by the seventh recital in the preamble to the Directive,
which stresses a fair apportionment of risk between the con-
317. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at
7, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 927, at 1 7 (comparing language of Consumer Protection Act's
Section 4(1) (e) and language of Directive's Article 7(e)). See also Directive, supra note
11, art. 7. Article 7(e) of the Directive states that:
The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he proves...
that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put
the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the
defect to be discovered.
Id.; Consumer Protection Act, supra note 53, at § 4(1) (e). Section 4(1) (e) of the Act
states:
In any civil proceeding by virtue of this Part against any person ("the person
proceeded against") in respect of a defect in a product.., it shall be a defence
for him to show that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the
relevant time was not such that a producer of products of the same description
as the product in question might be expected to have discovered the defect if
it had existed in his products while they were under his control.
Id.; PEARL, supra note 38, at 19 (comparing Article 7(e) of Directive with Section
4(1) (e) of Consumer Protection Act).
318. See PEARL, supra note 38, at 20 (citing European Commission's submission
that Section 4(1) (e) of CPA was more subjective); Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra
note 49, at 564 (noting face of Section (4) (1) (e) wording may seem more subjective).
319. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at 1
9, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 928, at 1 9 (stating argument of UK government that test laid
down by Consumer Protection Act is not substantively different from that of Directive);
Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1004 (noting United Kingdom replied that tests
administered in Consumer Protection Act and Directive were same).
320. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at I
10, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 928, at 1 10 (advocating that development risks be defined by
available scientific and technical knowledge). See also PEARL, supra note 38, at 20-21
(explaining in order for development risk defense to be meaningful, it has to refer to
producer's ability to discover defect).
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sumer and the producer.3 21
The Opinion of the AG sought to balance strict liability and
the fair apportionment of risk between the injured person and
the producer. 22 AG Tesauro recommended that liability should
depend on: (1) the state of scientific knowledge; and (2) the
accessibility of that knowledge.3 23 He concluded that the state of
scientific knowledge refers to the most advanced level of re-
search carried out at a given time, including all data available to
the scientific community, rather than the views expressed by the
majority.3 24 The harshness of this definition was tempered by
considerations of the accessibility of the information, assessing
the opportunity of the information to circulate. 325
Ultimately, AG Tesauro based his opinion on procedural
rather then substantive grounds. 2 6 Since there was no settled
case-law to interpret Section 4(1) (e), the United Kingdom
would be seen to infringe upon Article 169 of the EC Treaty only
if there is only one possible interpretation of the national provi-
sion, and that interpretation conflicts with the Community provi-
321. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at I
10, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 928, at 1 10 (citing Directive's objective of fair apportionment of
risk). See also PEARL, supra note 38, at 20 (noting United Kingdom's argument that
objectively verifiable standard is necessary for defense to provide fair apportionment of
risk set out in seventh recital of Directive).
322. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at
10, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 928, at 21, 24 (providing for strict liability by defining state of
scientific knowledge as most advance level of research and considering apportionment
of risk by taking into account accessibility of knowledge).
323. See Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1006-07 (noting AG concluded that
test for assigning liability is whether scientific knowledge would permit eradication of
defect and actual opportunities for information to circulate); Stapleton, Myths of Reform,
supra note 13, at 58 (reporting Court held that two separate aspects of issue had to be
considered: state of scientific and technical knowledge and accessibility of that knowl-
edge).
324. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [19971 E.C.R. at
21, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 933, at 21 (holding scientific knowledge refers to most advance
level of research, including all data available to scientific community). See also Howells
& Mildred, supra note 39, at 1006-07 (noting AG concluded that state of scientific
knowledge refers to most advanced opinion rather than majority view).
325. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at
24, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 933, at 25 (determining that accessibility of information may be
considered when evaluating opportunity for information to circulate). See also Howells
& Mildred, supra note 39, at 1007 (noting AG concluded that accessibility of knowledge
must be considered as well).
326. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at
7 26-28, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 933, at It 26-28 (deciding that there was no clear conflict
between Section 4(1) (e) of Consumer Protection Act and Article 7(e) of Directive).
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sion.3 27 Although Section 4(1) (e) is broader than Article 7(e) of
the Directive, there is essentially no clear conflict between the
two provisions, especially given Section 1 (1) of the Act,328 which
states, "[t]his Part shall have effect for the purpose of making
such provision as is necessary to comply with the Product Liabil-
ity Directive and shall be construed accordingly. 3 29 On May 29,
1997, the European Court of Justice endorsed the Opinion of
AG Tesauro, finding that the European Commission failed to
make out its allegation that Section 4(1) (e) of the act was incom-
patible with Article 7(e) of the Directive.33 °
4. Academic Debate Regarding Potential Interpretations
The United Kingdom's implementation of a modified ver-
sion of the development risk defense sparked a debate among
academics regarding the proper interpretation of the defense as
it is set out in the Directive.33 1 Christopher Hodges 3 2 and Pro-
327. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at
14, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 933, at 14 (explaining since there was no case-law interpreting
Section 4(1) (e) of Consumer Protection Act, United Kingdom would be held to in-
fringe Article 169 only if there is only one possible interpretation of Section 4(1) (e)
which directly conflicts with Article 7(e) of Directive). See also Howells & Mildred, supra
note 39, at 1007 (stating there was no irremediable conflict between two provisions).
328. See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, United Kingdom, [1997] E.C.R. at
9 26-28, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 933, at It 26-28 (noting Section 1 of Consumer Protection
Act required national courts to interpret other provisions of the Consumer Protection
Act in manner consistent with Directive). See also Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at
1007 (stating there was no irremediable conflict between two provisions); PEARL, supra
note 38, at 21 (noting Section 1 (1) of Consumer Protection Act required national court
to construe its provisions in manner consistent with Directive).
329. Consumer Protection Act, supra note 53, § 1(1). HODGES, supra note 17, at
648 (interpreting development risk defense in light of Section 1 (1) of Consumer Pro-
tection Act); PEARL, supra note 38, at 19 (noting interpretation of development risk
defense given Section 1(1) of Consumer Protection Act).
330. See United Kingdom, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 941, at 39 (holding European Com-
mission had failed to make out its allegation). See also PEARL, supra note 38, at 23 (not-
ing failure of European Commission to make out its allegation of incompatibility of
Consumer Protection Act provision and Directive provision).
331. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 569 (concluding practical
interpretation of development risk defense must include concept of reasonableness);
Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 60 (advocating accessibility/reasonableness
standard); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1015 (criticizing AG Tesauro's intro-
duction of elements of reasonableness and expectation into development risk defense).
332. See Report for the Commission of the European Communities on the Applica-
tion of Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products, Study Contract No.
ETD/93/B5-2000/MI/06, at 46, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/inter-
nal market/en/goods/prodliability.htm. Mr. Christopher Hodges was contracted by
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fessorJane Stapleton endorsed broad application of the develop-
ment risk defense with the purpose of encouraging innovation,
while Geraint Howells and Professor Mark Mildred championed
strong consumer protection through a narrow interpretation of
the defense.3 3
In a 1998 comment on United Kingdom, Hodges argued that
in practice, the development risk defense can only be inter-
preted by including a concept of reasonableness. 3 4 From a pol-
icy perspective, Hodges acknowledged that strict liability was the-
oretically simpler and cheaper to operate and that insurance
may off-set liability.3 '5 Hodges cautioned, however, that the in-
surance model breaks down when there are unknown risks
which cannot be quantified.33 6  Furthermore, Hodges empha-
sized the encouragement of innovation as a major aim of the
Directive. 3 7 As such, it was not practical to require producers to
do repetitive or excessive testing until all possible risks that
might occur with the use of a product had been identified.
3 1
the European Commission to study the implementation of the Directive in the EC. See
id.
333. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49 (advocating broad applica-
tion of development risk defense); Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13 (comment-
ing on necessity of importing reasonableness standard into interpretation of develop-
ment risk defense); Howells & Mildred, supra note 39 (arguing that development risk
defense does not belong in strict liability system). Many scholars, in the United King-
dom and abroad, addressed the issue. However, these four commentator have been
especially prolific and have written numerous articles related to the subject. See id.
334. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 569 (concluding practical
interpretation of development risk defense must include concept of reasonableness).
See also Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 60 (advocating accessibility/reasona-
bleness standard).
335. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 562 (acknowledging that
theoretically, strict liability was simpler and cheaper to operate). See also Explanatory
Memorandum, Bulletin European Commission, Supplement 11 1976 L. 11 (observing
theoretically, strict liability is simpler and cheaper to operate).
336. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 563 (stating insurance
model breaks down with unquantifiable but potentially overwhelming litigation); PROn-
ucT LIABILITY RULES IN OECD COUNTRIES (Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development, Sept. 1995) (noting breakdown of insurance model with unknown
risks).
337. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 562 (emphasizing major
aim of European Union policy is encouragement of innovation). See also Council Deci-
sion No. 96/413/EC, O.J. L 167/55 (1996) (stating in Third Recital "Whereas ... the
Council adopted the resolution of 21 November 1994 (4) on the strengthening of the
competitiveness of Community industry, which stressed in particular that a competitive
innovatory industry in the Community is a prerequisite for lasting economic growth
and the creation of new jobs").
338. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 561 (noting repetitive or
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Hodges stated that given practical limitations, it is appropriate
for citizens to share some of the development risks involved if
they decide to participate in the benefits of the product. 39 The
apportionment of risk, is thus the policy behind the development
risk defense, with the producer bearing the financial risk for
compensating injury caused by his defective products, and the
consumer bearing the unknown risks of innovation.340
Hodges suggested that the standard advocated by the Euro-
pean Commission was so high that it was questionable whether
the defense would ever succeed in practice and was therefore
contrary to the policy of apportionment of risk.341 Specifically,
Hodges evaluated the European Court of Justice's requirement
that the state of scientific and technical knowledge be discovera-
ble342  with consideration of accessibility of knowledge. 43
Hodges pointed to the Court's importation of the reasonable-
ness test in determining accessibility, 3 4 then argued that discov-
erability must also be regulated by the concept of reasonable-
ness, since defects that are discoverable only by extraordinary
means are indistinguishable from defects that are absolutely un-
excessive testing would discourage innovation). See also Council Directive No. 65/65/
EEC, amended by Council Directive No. 87/21/EEC, OJ. L 15/36 (1987) (stating as
Fourth Recital "Whereas, however, there are reasons of public policy for not con-
ducting repetitive tests on humans or animals without over-riding cause").
339. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 562 (stressing appropriate-
ness of consumers sharing development risks since they benefit from product); Staple-
ton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 60 (noting importance of fair apportionment of
risk between injured person and producer as goal set out in Directive).
340. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 563 (pointing out balance
of financial risk and development risks between injured person and producer); Staple-
ton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 60 (emphasizing importance of fair apportion-
ment of risk between injured person and producer as goal set out in Directive).
341. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 565 (stating high stan-
dards set by European Commission renders defense useless); Stapleton, Myths of Reform,
supra note 13, at 60 (commenting that development risk defense must be interpreted in
manner spelt out in CPA or else it would be nugatory defense).
342. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 566 (discussing knowledge
on which producer should act); Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 58-59 (men-
tioning scope of scientific and technical knowledge).
343. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 565 (describing accessibil-
ity of knowledge); Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 59-60 (commenting on
implied requirement of accessibility of knowledge).
344. See Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 566 (referring to Euro-
pean Court of Justice's holding that accessibility of knowledge requirement is implicit
in wording of Article 7(e)); Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 59-60 (noting
importance of accessibility requirement to discoverability of information within state of
knowledge).
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discoverable. 45 Professor Stapleton summarized four factors rel-
evant to the scope of scientific and technical knowledge under a
"less strained" interpretation of the defense: (1) the relevance
of the ideas of those with appropriate scientific and technical
facility; (2) the weight to be afforded them; (3) accessibility of
knowledge; and (4) the application of known information to a
novel context so that knowledge incorporates creative leaps of
application and methodology. 346
In contrast to Hodges & Professor Stapleton, Geraint How-
ells & Professor Mark Mildred criticized AG Tesauro as under-
mining the EC policy of strict product liability.347 In a published
rebuttal of Hodges arguments for the importation of a reasona-
bleness test in the development risk defense, Howells & Mildred
criticized Hodges for putting the interests of innovative produc-
ers over those of consumers.3 48 They commented that the issue
of insurance is irrelevant to the interpretation of the develop-
ment risk defense and is a merely part of the cost of business.349
Howells & Mildred further argued that the Court's importation
of an accessibility requirement is "both gratuitous and illogi-
cal."'3 50  According to Howells & Mildred, computerized
databases allow producers to educate themselves before putting
a product in production and circulation. 35 1 Thus, if the knowl-
345. Hodges, Unanswered Questions, supra note 49, at 567 (referring to Jane Staple-
ton's argument that since virtually everything is discoverable, defense must cover mat-
ters discoverable only by extraordinary means in order to achieve fair apportionment of
risk). See also Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1010 (citing to Jane Stapleton's
argument that since virtually everything is discoverable, defense must cover matters dis-
coverable only by extraordinary means).
346. See Stapleton, Myths of Reform, supra note 13, at 59 (stating "[t]hese four fac-
tors should, in my view, be sensibly regarded as relevant to whether knowledge has
entered the 'state of scientific and technical knowledge").
347. See Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1015 (lamenting introduction of
elements of reasonableness and expectation by AG Tesauro).
348. See Mildred & Howells, supra note 171, at 570 (asserting Hodges' attempt to
prioritize interests of innovative producers moves away from concerns underlying Direc-
tive). See also Directive, supra note 11, at 29 (referring to Recitals of Directive which list
protection of consumers and the fair apportionment of risk by imposition of liability with-
out fault as goals).
349. See Mildred & Howells, supra note 171, at 570 (arguing availability of insur-
ance or lack thereof is no reason to interpret defense one way or other and is merely
factor producer considers when deciding to launch product).
350. Id. at 572 (questioning how knowledge could be discoverable but not availa-
ble).
351. See id. (stating "[t] he existence of powerful computerized databases will allow
the producer to satisfy itself of the nature of published knowledge in the various fields
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edge exists, it is discoverable. 352
In another article published the same year, Howells & Mil-
dred recommended that the development risk defense should
be repealed all together because it runs counter to the rationale
of strict liability.353 They criticized Newdick as confusing negli-
gence and strict liability as found in the Directive.354 Citing data
provided by the First Report of the European Commission on
the Directive, Howells & Mildred argued that the fear that insur-
ance would become unavailable or prohibitively expensive under
a strict liability regime is unlikely to occur in the Member
States.3 5 They reasoned that the modest levels of damages in
the Member States, specifically the unavailability of punitive
damages in tort claims; 5 6 the absence of juries in civil trials;357
and the unlawfulness of contingency fees limiting access to legal
aid, 358 all serve to curb the amount of litigation likely to occur in
contrast to the situation in the United States.359
of knowledge before putting a product into the production stage and again before
putting it into circulation").
352. See Mildred & Howells, supra note 171, at 572 (asserting that given computer-
ized databases, producers have access to published knowledge before putting a product
into circulation).
353. See Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 987 (arguing that defense runs
counter to rationale of strict liability).
354. See id. at 1011 (stating Newdick's arguments indicate confusion between neg-
ligence and strict liability regimes).
355. See id. at 1013 (noting no perceptible increase in insurance premiums of de-
crease in availability of coverage since Directive came into effect). See also First Report,
supra note 52, at 2 (noting no apparent increase in level of insurance premiums); Re-
port, supra note 62, at 11-12 (noting no research had been undertaken to determine
impact of Directive on activity of pharmaceutical companies and generally, with excep-
tion of Austria, number of demands for polices had not increased considerably).
356. See Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1013 (commenting on lack of puni-
tive damages in tort cases); Christopher Hodges, Panel discussion at the Washington
D.C. Conference (Dec. 1, 2000), in GREEN PAPER AND THE FUTURE OF PRODUCr LIABILITY
LITIGATION IN EUROPE, Sept. 2001, at 7 [hereinafter Hodges, Panel discussion] (re-
marking that no European country has punitive damages for product liability claims).
357. See Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1013 (reporting absence ofjury trials
in Member States); Hodges, Panel discussion, supra note 356, at 7 (remarking thatjn
Europe, juries do not decide questions of liability).
358. See Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1013 (mentioning unlawfulness of
contingency fees in Member States); Hodges, Panel discussion, supra note 356, at 7
(noting absence of contingency fees in Member States).
359. See Howells & Mildred, supra note 39, at 1013-14 (explaining structural differ-
ence between European and U.S. litigation systems); Hodges, Panel discussion, supra
note 356, at 6-7 (reporting differences in legal culture between Europe and United
States).
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5. National Interpretation of Development Risk
To date, only a handful of cases have considered the devel-
opment risk defense. 6 ° In a German Supreme Court case, a
nine-year old girl was seriously injured when one of the two bot-
des of mineral water she picked up from her parents' cellar ex-
ploded, causing the glass to shatter.36 The German Supreme
Court rejected the development risk defense holding that the
Article 7(e) defense was not available for manufacturing de-
fects.36 2 In another German case, several customers were in-
fected with hepatitis A from ingesting a contaminated blackberry
cake. 63 The owner of the restaurant asserted that the defect in
the cake was undiscoverable.364 Similar to the German Supreme
Court, the appellate court in Germany found the defendant's
argument unconvincing, holding that (1) the defect in the cake
was a manufacturing defect and therefore the development risk
defense could not be used; and (2) even if the development risk
defense existed for the defect, there were scientific tests available
that could have detected the virus.36 5
360. See Hodges, Politics, Reform and Reality, supra, note 23, at 123-24 (summarizing
decisions in EC on development risk defense); PEARL, supra note 38, at 37-39 (discuss-
ing cases considering development risk defense). Hodges states that as of 2000, a total
of about thirty cases have been decided in national courts under the Directive, with two
in the United Kingdom, one in Ireland and a handful in Austria, Germany, and Spain.
Id.
361. See THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 584 (4th ed. 2002)
[hereinafter GERMAN LAW OF TORTS] (translating Entscheidungen des Bundesgericht-
shofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 129, 353 (1995) (F.R.G.)). See also
PEARL, supra note 38, at 37-38 (discussing exploding bottle case); Christopher Hodges,
The Case of the Exploding Bottle of Water, 18 PRODUCT LIABILITY INT'L 73 (1996) (discussing
German Federal Supreme Court's decision).
362. See GERMAN LAW OF TORTS, supra note 361, at 586 (holding development risk
defense applies only to design defects and not manufacturing defects). See also Hodges,
Politics, Reform and Reality, supra note 23, at 124 (stating German Supreme Court ruled
that development risk defense does not apply to manufacturing defects); Stapleton,
International Torts, supra note 230, at 383 (noting Court's assertion that development
risk defense did not apply to manufacturing defects). Manufacturing defects are still
under a strict liability system even under the Restatement (Third). Section 2(a) of the
Restatement (Third) covering manufacturing defects states that a product is defective if it
departs from its intended design, even if all possible care in the preparation and mar-
keting of the product was exercised. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §2(a).
363. See PEARL, supra note 38, at 39 (discussing German Blackberry Cake case).
364. See id. (reporting that defect in cake could not be discovered).
365. See id. (holding contaminated cake was manufacturing defect and not eligible
for development risk defense, and that even if the defense were available, contaminated
cake would not qualify because virus detection tests were available).
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In what was the only victory for the development risk de-
fense,3 66 a court in the Netherlands found the defendant non-
liable for HIV contaminated blood because they had acted in
accordance with the scientific and technical knowledge at the
time of product circulation.367 In that case, the plaintiff con-
tracted H1V when he received blood for cardiac surgery.3 68
Given the undisputed fact that HIV-1 RNA tests were "elaborate,
experimental, and not approved nor validated as a screening
test," the court found that the defendant had satisfied his bur-
den of proving the impossibility of discovering that the blood
was contaminated.369
The courts in the United Kingdom have had several oppor-
tunities to consider the development risk defense since the Euro-
pean Court of Justice's decision in United Kingdom.370  In
Abouzaid v. Mothercare (UK) Ltd.,37' Mothercare sold a sleeping
bag that was designed to be attached to a child's pushchair with
366. See Lovell's Study, supra note 66, at 50 (reporting only one reported example
where development risk defense has been successful); Meltzer, supra note 66, at 48
(pointing out that development risk defense has been successful in only one reported
case).
367. See Hartman/Stichting Sanquin Bloedvoorziening, 3 februari 1999, NJ 621
[Hartman v. Foundation Sanquin of Blood Supply, District Court of Amsterdam, Feb. 3
1999, NJ 621]. See Hodges, Politics, Reform and Reality, supra note 23, at 124 (discussing
Hartman v. Stichting Sanquin Bloedvoorziening, Feb. 3 1999, NJ 1994, nr. 621 and
stating that full text copy of case was unavailable in English at time of publication of
article). See also A & Others, [2001] 3 All E.R. 289, 1 53(iv) (discussing Scholten case);
Richard Goldberg, Paying for Bad Blood: Strict Liability after the Hepatitis C Litigation, 10
MED. LAW REv. 165, 198-99 (2002) (referring to Scholten v. Foundation Sanquin of
Blood Supply, Feb. 3, 1999, County Court of Amsterdam). The author assumes that the
Hartman case discussed by Hodges and the Scholten case discussed in A & Others and
by Goldberg are the same case since the facts seem identical.
368. See Hodges, Politics, Reform and Reality, supra note 23, at 124 (discussing facts
of case).
369. See Hodges, Politics, Reform and Reality, supra note 23, at 125 (discussing hold-
ing that development risk applied because defendant proved impossibility of discover-
ing that blood was contaminated). See also A & Others, [2001] 3 All E.R. 289, 1 53(iv)
(reviewing holding of County Court of Amsterdam, which decided it was not practical
at time of blood transfusion to use PCR test as screening test to detect HIV contamina-
tion in blood products); Goldberg, supra note 367, 198-99 (commenting on success of
development risk defense because it was not possible to detect HIV contamination us-
ing HIV-1 RNA test at time of blood donation).
370. See Abouzaid v. Mothercare (UK) Ltd., Case No. B3/2000/2273, 2000 WL
1918530 (Eng. C.A.); Richardson v. LRC Products Ltd., 2000 Lloyd's Rep. Med. 280
(Q.B. Div'l Ct. 2000); A & Others v. The National Blood Authority and Others, 3 All
E.R. 289 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 2001).
371. Case No. B3/2000/2273, 2000 WL 1918530 (Eng. C.A.).
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elasticated straps.3 72 In helping his mother attach the sleeping
bag to his brother's pushchair, the buckle on an elasticated fast-
ening sprung back hitting the twelve-year-old child in the eye
and severely damaging his eyesight. 373 Mothercare invoked the
development risk defense, arguing that there were no records of
similar incidents in the Department of Trade and Industry acci-
dent database, and that they were unaware of the potential
problems with buckle fastening.3 74 Lord Justice Pill of the Su-
preme Court of Judicature in the Court of Appeals found that
knowledge of previous accidents unnecessary to finding an ac-
tionable defect.3 73  With regards to the development risk de-
fense, LordJustice Pill remarked that it is not the Court's role to
determine what should have been done. 76 The important thing
was that the public was entitled to expect more from the pro-
ducer.377 In agreement with Lord Justice Pill that the develop-
ment risk does not apply, Lord Justice Chadwick commented
that a simple test would have revealed the defect.3 7 Not having
thought of that simple test was not excusable. 9
372. See Abouzaid v. Mothercare (UK) Ltd., Case No. B3/2000/2273, 2000 WL
1918530, 2 (Eng. C.A.) (noting fleece-lined sleeping bag for respondent's younger
brother); Ignorance Not Bliss For Producers, POST MAG., May 31, 2001, at 8 [hereinafter
Ignorance Not Bliss] (explaining sleeping bag was secured by elasticated straps).
373. See Abouzaid, 2000 WL 1918530 at 7 2, 4 (remarking on accident which
caused severe damage to twelve-years old child's eye); Ignorance Not Bliss, supra note 372,
at 8 (reporting twelve-year-old boy lost eyesight because elasticated strap sprung back
hitting him in eye).
374. See Abouzaid, 2000 WL 1918530 at 1 28 (commenting that Mothercare sought
to rely on evidence that Department of Trade and Industry accident database did not
have any record of comparable accident); Product is Defective Irrespective of History of Previ-
ous Accidents, TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at Features [hereinafter Product is Defective] (assert-
ing defendants sought protection under development risk defense).
375. See Abouzaid, 2000 WL 1918530 at 1 29 (holding that defect was present
whether or not previous accidents had occurred); Product is Defective, supra note 374, at
Features (pointing out that Lord Justice Pill found defect was present even if no previ-
ous accidents occurred).
376. See Abouzaid, 2000 WAIL 1918530 at 1 27 (expressing Court's role is not to de-
termine what should have been done).
377. See id. (arguing members of public were entitled to expect more from
Mothercare); Product is Defective, supra note 374, at Features (stating that there were no
relevant technical advances which would affect public expectation).
378. See Abouzaid, 2000 WIL 1918530 at 1 46 (remarking that simple practical test
would have been sufficient to discover defect); Product is Defective, supra note 374, at
Features (reporting that Lord Justice Chadwick pointed out that potential risks of at-
taching metal buckle to elasticated strap ought to have been known without need for
testing).
379. See Abouzaid, 2000 WL 1918530 at 1 46 (asserting that only reason simple test
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A year later, Mrs. Richardson sued LRC Products when the
condom her husband was using failed, causing her to become
pregnant.3 0  Although the case was dismissed on other
grounds,38 ' the Queen's Bench Division stated that development
risk defense would not have been applicable for known defects,
even if the defect could not be determined for every individual
product.3
82
Finally, in a case that has caused some debate over the de-
velopment risk defense, Justice Burton held in A & Others v. Na-
tional Blood Authority383 that unknown risks do qualify for the Ar-
ticle 7(e) defense, but unavoidable risks, which are known but
unavoidable, do not qualify for the defense.3 4 A & Others is a
class action suit brought by over a hundred claimants who had
been infected with Hepatitis C through blood transfusions. 8 5
The state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time of
infection did not allow the virus to be detected although medical
professionals knew of the risk of infection. 86 In ajudgment that
was not carried out was because producer had not thought of it). See also Paula Giliker,
Strict Liability for Defective Products: The Ongoing Debate, 24(4) Bus. L.R. 87, 89 (2000)
(noting that in Abouzaid case, "discovery" required but a simple, practical test and that
"[iut was no excuse that no-one had thought at the time to undertake this test").
380. See Richardson v. LRC Products Ltd., 2000 Lloyd's Rep. (Med.) 280 (Q.B.
Div'l Ct. 2000) (noting Richardson sued manufacturer of condom); Giliker, supra note
379, at 87 (observing case involved failed condom). Mrs. Richardson contends that the
fracture of the condom was caused by weakening due to ozone exposure in the factory.
See Richardson, 2000 Lloyd's Rep. Med. at 280 (noting Richardson claims condom frac-
ture was due to ozone damaging).
381. See Richardson, 2000 Lloyd's Rep. Med. at 284 (holding evidence did not prove
fracture leading to failure of condom was caused by cracks due to ozone exposure). See
also Newdick, supra note 295, at 472 (asserting that development risk defense should
not be extended to cover problems of quality control).
382. See Richardson, 2000 Lloyd's Rep. Med. at 285 (declaring that development
risk defense is not applicable to defects of known character just because there is not test
to reveal its existence in every case); A & Others v. The National Blood Authority and
Others, 3 All E.R. 289, at 53(ii) (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 2001) (quoting Richardson as stating
that development risk defense does not protect defendant when defect is known).
383. 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 2001).
384. See A & Others, 3 All E.R. 289, at 78 (stating unknown risks do qualify for
development risk defense but known risks, even though unavoidable, do not qualify for
defense). See also Consumer Protection Act 1987: Liability for Defective Products, 10(1) MEDI-
CAL L.R. 82, 84 (2002) [hereinafter MLR Summary] (noting that producers are liable
for known risk even if risks were unavoidable in particular product).
385. See A & Others, 3 All E.R. 289, at I (noting trial concerns 114 claimants
arising who have contracted Hepatitis C infection from blood and blood products). See
also Giliker, supra note 379, at 88 (reporting that over 100 claimants brought suit).
386. See MLR Summary, supra note 384, at 82 (noting at time of infection, risk of
infection through blood transfusion was impossible to avoid, either because there was
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runs over a hundred pages, Justice Burton reviewed the decision
of Commission v. United Kingdom,387 went through case law deal-
ing with the development risk defense from other EC coun-
tries388 and considered academic literature on the defense.38 9
Burton then concluded that since the risk of infection was
known, the producers continued to produce and supply the
product at their own risk. 9 ° Justice Burton went on to construe
Article 7(e) as exempting producers from liability when risks are
unknown but not when risks are known but unavoidable. 9 Ulti-
mately, Burton held that since the risk of Hepatitis C infection
was known, the development risk defense did not apply.3 92
III. THE EC, TAKING THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED BY
APPLYING LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES
A. The United States Experience
In the United States, product liability law is moving back to
a negligence standard for design defect cases.393 Generally
speaking, manufacturers are exempt from liability for design de-
fects that reflect unavoidable risks.3 94 Under the Restatement (Sec-
ond), imposition of liability for unknowable risks depends largely
no way to detect virus in blood or because virus was yet unknown to scientific public).
But see Goldberg, supra note 367, at 166-67 (reviewing state of scientific knowledge at
time of blood infections).
387. See A & Others, 3 All E.R. 289, at 53(i) (reviewing European Court of Jus-
tice's judgment in Commission v. United Kingdom).
388. See id. at 53(iii) (considering case law from Germany, Netherlands, and
Australia).
389. See id. at 54 (reviewing commentary from academia regarding policy consid-
erations related to development risk defense).
390. See id. at 74(ii) (stating producers that continue to produce and supply
products with known risks do so at their own risk). See also MLR summary, supra note
384, at 88 (noting producers are responsible for known risks).
391. See A & Others, 3 All E.R. 289, at 78 (explaining unknown risks qualify for
development risk defense but known risks do not qualify for defense even if unavoida-
ble). See also MLR Summary, supra note 384, at 84 (remarking that there is liability for
known but unavoidable risk).
392. See A & Others, 3 All E.R. 289, at 84 (concluding that since risk of Hepatitis
C infection was known, development risk is not applicable). See also MLR summary,
supra note 384, at 88 (noting information about risk of infection of Hepatitis C was
available to producers since 1970s).
393. See supra notes 273-81 and accompanying text (observing that Restatement
(Third) documents U.S. product liability law's shift back to negligence standard).
394. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text (noting that comment k exempts
manufactures for unavoidably unsafe products).
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on whether the consumer expectation standard395 or the risk-
utility standard is used to access defectiveness. 96 Jurisdictions
applying a pure consumer expectation test tend to staunchly
stand by their refusal to consider evidence of the state-of-the-art,
which goes to the issue of manufacturer's conduct rather than
the expectation of the consumer.397 Risk-utility jurisdictions, on
the other hand, find state-of-the-art evidence applicable for the
determination of scientific or technological feasibility of a rea-
sonable alternative design.398 Since state-of-the-art evidence re-
flects the limits of scientific or technological knowledge in prod-
uct development, admissibility of state-of-the-art becomes crucial
in predicting liability for defects caused by unknowable risks.399
In eliminating the consumer expectation test, the Restatement
(Third) has recognized U.S. product liability law's return to neg-
ligence.400
B. The Road Not Taken
Professor Henderson's dismal prediction that the EC strict
product liability experiment will merely repeat the U.S. experi-
ence was based on his perception that the EC was taking a road
already traveled by the United States.4 ° ' It is true that consistent
with the United States,4 0 2 the German courts interpreting the Di-
rective have decided that the development risk defense is inap-
plicable for manufacturing defects.40 3 Furthermore, the ruling
395. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (defining consumer expectation
test as safety that ordinary consumer expects).
396. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (defining risk-utility test as balanc-
ing test that considers potential risk of injury and cost to manufacturer of avoiding
injuries).
397. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (discussing inadmissibility of state-
of-the-art evidence under consumer expectation test).
398. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text (discussing admissibility of
state-of-the-art evidence as factor in determining existence of reasonable alternative de-
sign).
399. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text (observing role of state-of-the-
art evidence in predicting liability for unknown defects).
400. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (reporting how Restatement (Third)
reflects U.S. product liability law's return to negligence).
401. See supra notes 288-92 and accompanying text (outlining Henderson's criti-
cism of EC in basing its Directive on Section 402A of Restatement (Second)).
402. See supra note 362 (stating manufacturing defects are still under strict liability
system, even under Restatement (Third)).
403. See supra notes 361-65 and accompanying text (discussing German cases that
do not allow development risk defense for manufacturing defect).
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in the Netherlands to allow the defense to insulate suppliers of
blood products4° 4 comports with the U.S. policy of protecting
sellers of blood from strict product liability. 405 The similarities
end here however.
In Commission v. United Kingdom, the European Court ofJus-
tice concluded that liability would depend on the state of scien-
tific knowledge and accessibility to that knowledge.40 6 But un-
like the state-of-the-art, which at one point varied from being in-
dustry custom to the currently accepted definition of scientific
and technological feasibility,40 7 the European Court of Justice
clearly defined the state of scientific knowledge as the most ad-
vanced knowledge available in the field.40 8
The United Kingdom's ruling in Abouzaid further limits
what qualifies as scientific knowledge.4"9 The Supreme Court of
Judicature in the Court of Appeals imposed liability on the man-
ufacturer despite the fact that no records of similar incidents
were found in the Department of Trade and Industry accident
database. 410  One interpretation of Abouzaid is that the defec-
tively design elasticated fastening"' is more like the defectively
designed refrigerator in Newdick's article,41 2 and would be con-
sidered general knowledge rather than scientific and technical
knowledge. As proposed by Newdick, the lack of general knowl-
edge should not insulate a manufacturer from liability.413
404. See supra notes 367-69 and accompanying text (observing Dutch court's deci-
sion did not hold blood supplier liable for contaminated blood).
405. See supra note 32 (summarizing U.S. blood shield statutes in insulating sellers
of blood from strict product liability).
406. See supra note 323 and accompanying text (reviewing Commission v. United
Kingdom where European Court of Justice advanced two-prong test to determine
whether liability should be imposed for development risks).
407. See supra notes 201-26 and accompanying text (commenting on various defini-
tions of state-of-the-art).
408. See supra note 324 and accompanying text (defining state of scientific knowl-
edge as most advanced knowledge in field).
409. See supra notes 371-79 and accompanying text (explaining court's decision
not to allow development risk defense of defects that may be discovered by simple test).
410. See supra note 374 and accompanying text (reporting lack of records showing
accidents involving elasticated fastenings).
411. See supra note 373 and accompanying text (describing case where elasticated
fastening sprung back and injured child).
412. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text (giving example of what
Newdick considers general knowledge).
413. See supra note 304 and accompanying text (remarking on Newdick's proposal
that lack of general knowledge does not provide defense for manufacturer, whereas
lack scientific/technical knowledge does result in defense).
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Additionally, the scope of the development risk defense for
design defect cases was outlined by Richardson v. LRC"14 and by
Justice Burton's ruling in A & Others.4 15 Read together, the
United Kingdom has clearly shown itself willing to impose liabil-
ity for unavoidable risks, but allows the development risk defense
for unknown risks.4" 6 The United Kingdom's application of the
development risk defense contrasts with the U.S. approach of
not excusing unknown risks, exemplified by the consumer ex-
pectation test,41 7 and the forgiveness of comment k for unavoid-
ably unsafe products.4"'
The controversies surrounding the development risk de-
fense are unlikely to subside. The differing treatment of con-
taminated blood in the Netherlands4 19 and the United King-
dom420 portends numerous future debates on the subject. At
the present time, analysis of EC trends is limited by the lack of
case law in national courts.4 2 " From what has been decided, it
appears that the development risk defense remains applicable
for cases where the defect in product design is due to an un-
known scientific risk.4 22 Those like Professor Henderson may ar-
gue that Europe is using the development risk defense as a Euro-
pean comment k, in order to carve out a special place for pharma-
ceutical products.423 One important difference in the EC
interpretation of the development risk defense is that producers
414. See supra notes 380-82 and accompanying text (deciding case on other
grounds but stating that development risk defense was not available for known defects,
even if defect could not be determined for every individual product).
415. See supra notes 390-92 and accompanying text (holding development risk de-
fense did not apply because risk of Hepatitis C infection was known).
416. See supra note 391 and accompanying text (construing Article 7(e) as exempt-
ing producers from liability for unknown risks but not unavoidable risks).
417. See supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text (exemplifying consumer expec-
tation approach to state-of-the-art evidence).
418. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text (discussing comment k exemp-
tion for unavoidably unsafe products)
419. See supra notes 367-69 and accompanying text (reporting Dutch court's deci-
sion not hold blood supplier liability for contaminated blood).
420. See supra notes 383-92 and accompanying text (holding producer liability for
contaminated blood because risk of Hepatitis C infection was known).
421. See supra note 360 and accompanying text (noting scarcity of case law inter-
preting development risk defense).
422. See supra note 391 and accompanying text (observing UK's interpretation of
development risk defense exempts producers from liability for unknown risks but not
unavoidable risks).
423. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text (observing that comment k
carves out exception for unavoidably safe products).
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escape liability for unknown risks, while unavoidable risks are
not excused.4 24 Given this compromise, the Directive truly im-
poses strict, but not absolute liability on producers. Contrary to
Professor Henderson's scathing remarks about the backwardness
of the EC Directive,425 the EC has learned its lesson from the
United States and has chosen a deliberate path towards strict lia-
bility.
Issues of distinguishing strict liability from negligence aside,
the implementation of the development risk defense reflects the
priority the EC has given to the strict liability label at the ex-
pense of apportionment of risk and encouraging innovation.4 2 6
The impact on pharmaceutical manufacturers is enormous.4 27
As was feared by Hodges and Professor Stapleton,428 the ex-
tremely narrow interpretation of the development risk defense
has made it essentially worthless to producers.429 With pharma-
ceutical research and development stunted by concerns of liabil-
ity,43 it is arguable that strict liability will ultimately prove to be a
win for advocates of consumer protection.
CONCLUSION
What results from national interpretation of the develop-
ment risk defense is the opportunity for producers to escape lia-
bility only when the defect in the product is unknown. The in-
terpretation of the development risk defense by the Member
States indicates that unlike the United States, the EC is staying
their course on the road to strict liability.
424. See supra note 391 and accompanying text (reporting that contrary to United
States, United Kingdom imposes liability for unavoidable risks but not unknown risks).
425. See supra notes 288-94 and accompanying text (discussing Henderson's criti-
cism of Directive for following Section 402A of Restatement (Second)).
426. See supra note 340 and accompanying text (arguing that main objective of
Directive is apportionment of risk); supra note 337 and accompanying text (emphasiz-
ing encouragement of innovation as major aim of Directive).
427. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting importance of development
risk defense to pharmaceutical sector).
428. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (arguing narrow interpretation of
defense would be make it impracticable).
429. See supra note 286 and accompanying text (pointing out that many practition-
ers and academics feel that narrow interpretating of defense has made it defense of
little value).
430. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (stating United States' decision not to
impose strict liability was based on concern with deterring effect of strict liability on
innovation).
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